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Who Are the "People" in the Preamble
to the Constitution?
Morris D. Forkosch
Professor Forkosch asks the provocative question, "Who are 'W1e the
People' in the Preamble to the Constitution?" He seeks to answer this
question by examining the political climate existent at the time of the
Constitution's drafting. This inquiry leads to a survey of the document's
predecessors such as the Magna Carta, Mayflower Compact, and the Penn-
sylvania Charter of Privileges, as well as a comparison with similar docu-
ments such as the Articles of Confederation. Professor Forkosch argues,
on the basis of the foregoing, that at the time the Constitution was drafted
the term people included only the very small and select group of people
who could vote. He then points out that the term was not then and is not
now a static one, but through subsequent amendments and judicial inter-
pretation has been ever increasing in scope. The Professor concludes that
today the term has evolved from one including only voters to one con-
strued to include almost all natural persons.
HAT DOES the phrase, "We the People' of the United States,"
as used in the Preamble2 to the Federal Constitution, mean?
Is Lincoln's paean, that we are "the Almighty['s] ... almost chosen
people,"3 to be accepted, or should a mundane dictionary definition4
be satisfactory? Or, is the
phrase merely an illusory, pla-
THE AUTHOR: MORRIS D. FORKOSCH tonic abstraction so that politi-
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M.S.Sc., Ph. D., New School for Social phers may philosophize, and no
Research) is a Professor of Law at the
Brooklyn Law School. one ever come substantively to
grips with it?6 Additionally,
is it, or should it, be limited to
political and legal considerations, or may others enter for pur-
l Save for one or two State constitutions, all others, except as noted below, at some
point begin or insert "We, the people of ... ," and conclude with "do ordain this con-
stitution," or "establish it," or "ordain and establish it." There are three individual
other, but analogous, forms, "The people of... ," or "The people inhabiting.. ," or
"We, the delegates and representatives of the people of ...." See COLUMBIA UNI-
VERSITY, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 777-81 (2d ed. 1959).
2 In full the Preamble is:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
The ends expressed are not discussed. For example, what is meant by "Justice"? How-
ever, it may be noted that to "secure" liberty does not mean to obtain, but to safeguard,
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poses of explanation and understanding; may it also be understood
in terms of economics, sociology, defense, et cetera? Was "the Peo-
ple" ever, or is it today, meant to be an inclusive or exclusive term,'
and has it been broadened significantly in actual and constitutional
interpretation and application? These are certainly profound and
intriguing questions for the purposes of history,8 politics, and law'
what the people have, as with the Declaration of Independence. See Z. CHAFEE, JR.,
How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 10-11 (1952).
3 Address to New Jersey Senate, Feb. 21, 1861, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF LIN-
COLN 236 (0. Basler ed. 1953). See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTON (1967).
4 Webster initially defines the term in its plural sense, and then gives other sub-
divisions and definitions. MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1673 (3d ed. 1965).
5 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Hamilton), where Hamilton expatiates upon the
defects of the Articles of Confederation and concludes with the contention that
the foundations of our national government [should be laid) deeper than in
the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire
ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The
streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original
fountain of all legislative authority. Id. at 143 (P. Ford ed. 1898).
Madison agrees. Id. No. 46, at 310-11; id No. 49, at 334. In id. No. 45, at 296
he declaims, "if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of
America. . .." But see note 104 infra.
6 See, e.g., Stalnaker, Events, Periods, and Institutions in Historians' Language, in 6
HISTORY AND THEORY 159, 164 (1967) (general analysis of holistic terms). On a
parallel type of problem see Palmer, Notes on the Use of the Word "Democracy"
1789-1799, 68 POL. ScL Q. 203 (1953), whose excellent survey for that period em-
braces the European nations and a short reference to the newly formed United States.
7 For the purposes of this examination, political and legal considerations necessitate
a bifurcation of the totality of human beings within the geographical area into those
eligible to participate in the affairs of government and those not so eligible; the latter,
again, is subdivided into those not eligible because of factors which apply equally to
all, including those factually eligible, such as age, residence, alienage, etc., and those not
eligible for reasons which involve purposeful discrimination and unequal treatment,
and which today's approach would reject, e.g., property qualifications.
8 The opening sentence of 1 J. MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1883) is: "'The subject of my narrative is the history of the people
of the United States," and also, "the history of the people shall be the chief theme" of
this study. The author later mentions the low state into which the Congress, under the
Articles of Confederation, had fallen by 1784, and on this writes that "Much blame
also lay with the people." Id. at 135. "Demagogues were constantly reminding the
people that the United States were thirteen independent republics .... ." Id. at 137.
Who these generality of "people" are, their specific composition and inclusions and
exceptions, is never quite made clear - and, in effect, this may be said of practically
all other histories and essays in this area. See, e.g., G. MYERS, THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN IDEALISM 13, 193, 332, 349 (1925).
9 The Supreme Court, of course, has rejected the contention, recently revived in 1
W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 374-79 (1953), that the Preamble is "the source of any [particular] substan-
tive power conferred on the Government of the United States or on any of its Depart-
ments. Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Consti-
tution and such as may be implied from those so granted." Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905); accord, 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 334 (Hunt ed.
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which, in the light of present-day and future national (and inter-
national) considerations and social needs, require exploration.'
This exploration breaks down simply into: an examination of
the language of the Constitution itself, including its amendments,
and other relevant documents; preconstitutional and contemporary
(1789) views, interpretations, and applications of the term(s); the
statements made during the drafting of the Constitution to ascer-
tain some degree of meaning; an analysis of language of the ninth
and 10th amendments, as well as their subsequent judicial and gov-
ernmental interpretations and applications, to disclose the meaning
of "people" not only in them but also in the Preamble; and, finally,
current approaches and needs."
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE
In the original, unamended Constitution the word "people" oc-
curs one time in the Preamble, one time in article I, section 2, clause
1, and no place else in the document! There are, of course, numer-
ous other references to particular individuals," and the word "per-
son(s)" appears 21 times, but of this latter use' at least 16 are so
particular that they must be excluded from present consideration.' 4
1906) (1799 address to the Virginia General Assembly). Madison opposed the Alien
and Sedition Laws "as palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution." Id. at
406. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 462 (2d ed. 1851).
10 In 1953 Crosskey, before he discussed the document somewhat in extenso, un-
dertook first "to provide the reader ... with a specialized dictionary of the eighteenth-
century word-usages, and political and legal ideas, which are needed for a true under-
standing of the Constitution .... ." 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 9, at 5. No such
ambitious undertaking is here assumed, even if pertinent to the subject matter. It may
be remarked that Crosskey's analysis led him, at least for the Preamble, into rather
farfetched conclusions, here rejected.
11 In discussing "the People," however, it is somewhat necessary also to examine
"person(s)" as a word which, at times, may be included in the concept. See, e.g., text
accompanying notes 12-42 infra. To the extent, therefore, that these terms may be so
interchangeable or relevant in a particular context, the analysis is slightly widened ini-
tially.
12 E.g., the President, Vice President, Senators, Representatives, Speaker (of the
House), Ambassadors, and so on, are mentioned, but in article III one finds no mention
of a Chief Justice ("Judges ... of the supreme and inferior Courts" are mentioned) so
that one necessarily must go to article I, section 3, clause 6 to discover an indirect men-
tion of such a person, albeit even here we are not explicitly told it is the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. That clause gives the Senate the sole power to try all impeach-
ments, save that when the President is so tried "the Chief Justice shall preside ...."
33 "Person" must be taken in context, for it may or may not include citizens, aliens,
Indians, corporations, and the like. See M. PORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 283
n.1 (1956).
14 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2; id. § 3, cl. 3; id. § 6, cl. 2; id. § 7, cl. 2; id. § 9, cl. 8;
id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. cl. 2 (five times); id. cl. 4 (twice); id. art. III, § 3, d. 1; id. cl. 2;
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The fate of the remainder of these five uses of "persons" is inter-
esting and, perhaps, illuminating. The first two of these uses, found
in the first sentence of article I, section 2, clause 3, have since been
replaced by the first sentence of section 2 of the 14th amendment.
The next two such uses, found in article I, section 9, clause 1, have
lapsed because of that dause's own built-in time limitation and, if
necessary, because of the adoption of the 13th amendment. The
fifth and last use, which is to be found in article IV, section 2, clause
3, has been superseded 'by the 13th amendment. In effect, there-
fore, since only the 14th amendment's first sentence contains one
use of "persons," the original Constitution even as so amended can-
not today be said to refer generally to "persons" except as just men-
tioned.
The amendments to the Constitution may also be so examined
for "people" and "persons." The latter term appears in six of the
amendments a total of 27 times, but in most of these instances the
use is either sufficiently specialized or sufficiently irrelevant to the
present inquiry as to be discarded. 5 It is only in the fourth and
id. art. IV, § 2, c. 2. In all of these references a particular person is referred to, or the
clause is extremely limited, e.g., "No Person shall be convicted of Treason." Id. art.
i,§ 3, cl. I.
15The amendments are the fourth, fifth, 12th, 14th, 20th, and 22d. In the fourth
the word is used twice to illustrate one aspect of "people"; in the fifth the word is used
twice, very generalized as "No person" and "any person," with a subsequent use of
"himself" referring, of course, to "person"; in the 12th the word is used 10 times (a
record to be compared with its use five times in article II, section 1, clause 2) in an ex-
ceedingly particularized fashion, e.g., "the person voted for as President"; in the 14th's
section 1 it is used thrice, in section 2 once, and in section 3 once, but it is only in the
last such use, analogous to the 12th's, that rejection must occur; in the 20th's sections
3 and 4 the analogy is again to its use in the 12th; and in the 22d's five uses the same
analogy is applicable.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that of the 15 amendments subsequent to the
contemporary Bill of Rights, no fewer than 11 are concerned, directly or as interpreted,
with the political aspects of government, and only five deal with economic power or
concepts (the 14th is included in both categories). In effect, therefore, the thesis of
Charles Beard, not that the Constitution was made by the delegates for their own per-
sonal benefit, but that the delegates represented distinct economic groups whose inter-
ests were (unconsciously) furthered, can here possibly be rejected for political reasons,
i.e., that the Constitution is basically a political document as also disclosed by the num-
ber and type of amendments subsequently "correcting" it. C. BEARD, AN EcoNOMIc
INTERPRETATiON OF THE CONSTITUTION 73 (1960); see 1 C. BEARD, THE RISE OF
AmRICAN CIVILIZATiON 306-07 (1927). But see C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE
CONsrrrTON AND THE SUPREME COURT 77-78 n.1 (new rev. & enlarged ed. 1935);
C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONs=TUTION 69-70 & n.1 (1928) (attacking
the thesis historically and economically); note 136 infra. Of course a counter may be
expressed that of the amendments since the first 10, at least the 14th, have been so in-
terpreted and applied as to reduce the power of property, production, and profit. See,
e.g., the discussion in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952),
and the substantive content given to the 14th beginning with dictum in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); since this necessarily implies such a need because of
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19: 644
14th amendments that the six usages of "persons" hold interest for
us. Briefly, the fourth's opening clause, "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches .... ." discloses literally that "persons" refers
to "people" through the use of the pronoun "their," and so trans-
lates into the physical individual who has this right; likewise for
the second use of "person" in the last few words of this amendment.
While this interpretation would superficially limit "people" to hu-
man beings, the decisions hold otherwise.' 6 In the first sentence
of section 1 of the 14th amendment, the term can refer only to hu-
mans, while the second sentence's two uses have long been held by
the Supreme Court to include not only humans, regardless of status,
e.g., aliens, but also corporations. 7 As for the use of "people" in
the amendments, there are only seven instances and, in two of
these, a question of limitation and therefore relevance may arise."In effect, therefore, a maximum of seven "people" and six "persons"
existing contrary views, it may now be concluded that the Constitution sought to support
and continue, if not to increase, such power, i.e., the economic tinge.
16 See note 205 infra.
17 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). Justice
Black, in 1938, rejected this last inclusion. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (dissenting opinion); see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
68 (1947) (dissenting opinion), with Justice Douglas joining, and Justices Murphy and
Rutledge having "one reservation and one addition to make," not here important.
Id. at 123. On the background of this amendment see generally, e.g., H. FLACK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); J. JAMEs, THE FRAMING
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956). In Adamson, Justice Black stated that
"the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment [was] to extend to all the people
of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights." 332 U.S. at 89. Here
"people" refers to every human being, regardless of status, and excludes corporations.
But a non sequitur must occur if the Justice's views are followed, for if the entirety of
the Bill of Rights is so incorporated without change, then its provisions regarding, for
example, unreasonable searches and seizures, even in a limited degree, cannot apply to
corporations - and yet Black has not objected to this inclusion. See, e.g., Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (opinion by Rutledge, J.).
See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 387 (1920), where
the Government strongly contended that since a corporation could not plead the fifth
amendment's immunity against self-incriminating testimony as to its books and papers
"then it can not indirectly obtain the benefit of this Amendment by objecting" under
the fourth. Id. at 389-90. Justice Holmes, in a 7-2 decision, said that "the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected .... " Id. at 392.
See also note 284 infra. And, of course, Justice Black has supported a corporation's
rights of free speech. "I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that the Times ...
had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish.., criticisms .... " New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964); see id. at 295-97.
18The amendments are the first, second, fourth, ninth, 10th, and 17th. In the
first two paragraphs of the last, the term appears, but is limited to the people of each
State singly, rather than of the nation as a whole, and the reference is really to the
"voters" of a State rather than to all of the people.
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are in the amendments, and of these 13 uses a few must, as shown
later, be limited or excluded.
In the Preamble and in the Constitution itself, therefore, the
term "people" is found only twice, plus seven times in the amend-
ments; in the Constitution there is no significant current use of
"person" (although five preamendment uses may be referred to),
while in the amendments proper there is a maximum use of only
six such instances; and, finally, in the entirety of the Preamble, Con-
stitution, and amendments, the maximum use of "people" and "per-
sons" is therefore found in 15 instances. For a "government of the
people, by the people, for the people," it seems almost sacrilegious
that our fundamental document contains this term only twice, and
only nine times if the subsequent amendments are added; and even
if "persons" is thrown in, the significant total rises only to a maxi-
mum of 15.
For purposes of illumination and contrast, the Declaration of
Independence and the Articles of Confederation, as well as the two
Constitutions of the Confederate States of America, may be exam-
ined.19 The first20 of these documents contains 10 instances of
39 Although not discussed in extenso, the United Nations and its documents are of
interest. Two items merit examination, the Charter itself, and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.
The Charter's preamble, like that of the United States Constitution, opens with "We
the Peoples of the United Nations ...." It then states why they are combining, i.e.,
the ends, and then "to accomplish these aims. our respective Governments" have
"assembled" through "representatives" who "have agreed to the present Charter ...."
In L GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS (1946), the opening language is referred to as follows: "While the
Preamble to the Charter opens with the words 'We the peoples of the United Nations,'
the concluding words of the Preamble, 'Accordingly our respective Governments ...'
make it clear that the Charter is not a constituent act of the peoples of the United Na-
tions, but rather an agreement freely entered into between governments." Id. at 19.
The insertion of these words was proposed by the Delegation of the United
States. The purpose was to emphasize that the Charter is an expression of
the will of the peoples of the world and is primarily concerned with their
welfare. The proposal was inspired by the opening words of the Constitution
of the United States. Id. at 55.
However, the document is a compact between and among governments, not peoples,
and, in any event, the question still remains, what peoples?
20 The best accounts of the evolution of the Declaration of Independence are in
C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS (1933); J. BOYD, DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE TEXT (1943); J. HAZELTON, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(1906). An outstanding summary is given in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
413-33 (J. Boyd ed. 1950), and a good bibliography is presented in E. DuMBALD, THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 171-89 (1950).
In D. HAwKE, A TRANSACTION OF FEE MN 247-66 (1964), Becker's almost cynical
attitude is given.
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"people," and while in most of these the use is here irrelevant,2' this
is not so in all cases; the term "person" is not even found once in
the Declaration of Independence. The Articles of Confederation 22
use "people" and "person" three and nine times, respectively. The
Constitution's penurious use of "people" (two or one) may thus be
contrasted with its extended use in the Declaration (10) and lim-
ited use in the Articles (three), while the Constitution's extended
use of "persons" (21) may be contrasted with its absence in the
Declaration and its moderate (nine) use in the Articles. However,
not all such uses are relevant or important, as it is primarily a ques-
tion of concept with which we are concerned.
The two Confederate Constitutions include that of February 8,
1861 for the provisional government, and the permanent document
of March 11, 1861. The introductory paragraph to the first docu-
ment mentions only "a Congress of the Sovereign and independent
States," and the Preamble speaks of "We, the Deputies of the Sov-
ereign and Independent States." The permanent document's Pre-
amble, however, begins "We, the people of the Confederate States,
each State acting in its sovereign and independent character,"2 " and,
save for some differences,24 follows the general form, style, and lan-
guage of the Constitution of the United States. In the permanent
21 E.g., the opening sentence is, "When, in the Course of human events, it becomes
necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with
another. ... Here the term is generalized so that "nation," "country," or a similar
concept may be substituted, although it can also be limited to those who trace their
heritage to England. See, e.g., 2 THE VORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42 (P. Ford
ed. 1904), giving the first phrasing as "a People." Separately, the Declaration uses
other terms, e.g., "all men," for which "all people" may be substituted.
22 See the excellent interpretation of the internal problems and background, as well
as the drafting, in M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE SOCIAI.-CONSTITUIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1774-1781 (1940) [hereinafter cited as THE ARTICLES]. See generally M. JENSEN,
THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNIrED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERA-
TION 1781-1789 (1950) [hereinafter cited as THE NEW NATION].
2 3 These documents may be found in I JOURNAL OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CON-
FEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. No. 234, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 899, 909
(1904).
24 E.g., Perm. Conf. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 1 forbad the importation of Negroes,
and clause 2 gave the Congress power so to prohibit from the other (Northern) States;
clause 4 prevented the impairment of any property right in Negro slaves; additional re-
strictions upon Congress are found in section 9, and most of the Bill of Rights to the
United States Constitution was repeated there. Article IV, section 2, clause 1 gave
privileges and immunities to State citizens, and then gave them "the right of transit and
sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property, and the
right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired." See also Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), holding a Negro not to be a citizen under the
Constitution so that his appeal could not be entertained and, gratuitously, stating
Congress could not exclude slavery from the territories. Other differences are not fur-
ther explored.
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document, "people" occurs in the Preamble once and then, in a com-
bined Constitution and Bill of Rights, occurs six more times; "per-
sons" occurs 24 times.25 The opening session of the Provisional
Congress was presented with "divers ordinances and resolutions
adopted by the several conventions of the peoples of the independ-
ent States" of the South, and those conventions of South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana all opened with "We the people
of the State of," while Alabama's declaration was "by the people
of," and Mississippi's "The people of" 2" Nevertheless, as shown
above, the provisional Constitution rejected "people" for "States,"
although the permanent Constitution replaced this by "We, the
people."2  Subsequent accretions to the Confederacy were those of
Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia, and it was generally the States as such which acted.2"
This difficulty in determining whether the "people" or the "States"
acted2" is reflected in the duality of the theories upon which south-
erners relied for their conduct, i.e., that the people had an inherent
right of revolution, and that the States had a constitutional right to
secede."0 Regardless, an inconsistency is immediately apparent if
25 Ten of these in article II, section I have to do with the election of the two chief
officers.
26 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONGRESS OF 'T CONFEDERATE STATES OF AimucA,
.rupra note 23, at 7-9.
2 7 Ratification of the permanent Constitution was speedy, and in several instances
the resolutions were referred either to the people or to a new ratifying convention; for
example, the Texas convention considered whether to submit the permanent Constitu-
tion to the people at the ballot boxes. See generally C. LEE, THE CONFEDERATE
CONS TJTIONS 128-40 (1963).
2 8 E.g., Missouri's resolution to withdraw from the Union was "enacted by the gen-
eral assembly" although its accretion to the Confederacy was by "[tihe general assembly
... for and in behalf of the people" of the State. See generally 2 JOURNAL OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERIcA, supra note 23, at 481. In Vir-
ginia's case, a convention between the Confederacy and "The Commonwealth of Virginia"
was first entered into, although "[wle, the delegates of the people of Virginia" thereafter
ratified the new Constitution. Id. at 190-97. Kentucky's regular legislature and govern-
ment was repudiated by a convention which established a provisional government and,
as Jefferson Davis claimed in his message to the Confederate Congress, in that State's
communications "will be found a powerful exposition of the misrepresentation of the
people by the government of Kentucky .... " Id. at 536. The convention severed its
connections with the Union "and, in the name of the people," declared the State to be
free and independent. Id. at 537.
2 9 As disclosed below, the 1787 Constitution was ratified by specially elected con-
ventions, not States. See note 131 infra.
80 E.g., the Provisional Governor of Kentucky, in a letter to Jefferson Davis for-
warded with the other items, wrote:
The action of the people of this State... for the protection of their rights
of person and property, was based, as a necessity, upon the ultimate right of
revolution .... The constitutional right of secession by the State... was not
possible, because . . . [it] was denied us by the enslaved members of the
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"people" is limited, with exceptions and exclusions resulting in a
small minority determining the conduct of the totality; and, without
referring to others, this inconsistency is found expressed in the
Confederacy's own constitutional provisions concerning the Ne-
groes,31 as well as its judicial treatment of them as chattels.32
The concept of "people" in the United States Constitution and
the other documents varies in different contexts and places,3" so that
its uses, as heretofore described, required some preliminary exam-
ination to discard the obviously irrelevant; e.g., corporations and
partnerships are not within the Preamble's use of the term. 4 Even
so, ambiguities and generalities abound in even supposedly relevant
uses. For example, the opening sentence in the Declaration of In-
dependence is, "When, in the course of human events, it becomes
necessary for one people to" separate from another, "they should
declare the" reasons why. Here the term appears symbolically to
encompass the totality of humans in the colonies, and elsewhere
"the people" 5 and "the good people of these colonies"36 are like-
legislature . . . There is no incompatibility between the right of secession
by a State and the ultimate right of revolution by the people. The one is a
civil right founded upon the Constitution; the other is a natural right resting
upon the law of God. Letter from Governor George W. Johnson to Jeffer-
son Davis, Nov. 21, 1861, in I JOURNAL OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CON-
FEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 23, at 541.
See also J. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789-1861, at 196-
99 (1930). The fortunes of the Confederacy in Kentucky ebbed with the defeat of its
army, and the provisional government became a fugitive one; in the post-war era the
State's court of appeals held the official acts of the provisional officers to be invalid.
Simpson's Ex'r v. Loving, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 458 (1867); cf. Ward v. State, 42 Tenn. 605
(1866).
31 Of course the reply then was that Negroes were not included as "the people,"
as others were not. There is nothing strange in this overall approach. For example,
although Zimmern writes that in fifth-century Athens "the people is the Government,"
A. ZIMMERN, THE GREEK COMMONWEALTH 129 (5th rev. ed. 1931), Plato and Aris-
tode and all others, then excluded slaves from inclusion is "people" or "citizens."32 See, e.g., W. ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GREY 245-46 (1941), for a discussion of
Negroes being attached. The author states that the "testimony of slaves was admissible
in certain cases, particularly in cases for or against other slaves ...." Id. at 197 n.2.
Two questions emerge: if Negroes are not "people," how can a court accept jurisdiction
in a suit by Slave v. Slave, for would this not permit a suit by Horse v. Jackass (reviving
Roman law concepts as well as in rem and forfeiture cases); and, if treated as animals
(i.e., chattels), how could a criminal prosecution be conducted (again unless Roman
concepts were utilized)? Theories, of course, give way to practical necessities.
33 In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), Hughes, C.J. stated: "The use in the
Federal Constitution of the same term in different relations does not always imply the
performance of the same function." Id. at 365-66.
34 See, e.g., note 291 infra.
35 In paras. 2, 7, 8, 12 and 26 ("our people"), and 30 ("a free people"). See also
para. 28 which refers to "our fellow-citizens" instead of "our people," but without
change in concept.
36 Para. 32. It is interesting to note that Jefferson's "Rough draught" of the Dec-
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wise so referred toY In one instance, however, the Declaration ac-
cuses King George of having "refused to pass other laws for the
accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people
would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature .... ""
but while the reference is thus to a portion of the entirety, e.g., one
colony or city, and even more particularly to a voting or represented
second portion of this first portion, the concept is here not to be
overly differentiated from the generality. This does not necessarily
mean that "the people" in the Declaration need therefore not be
further analyzed; on the contrary, interesting depths may now be
plumbed by quoting one historian's view on the authority of the
Pennsylvania Convention"9 which, on July 25th, approved the Con-
gressional declaration of the preceding 4th, namely, that "the Con-
vention ... took its power direct from the people . . . ." In the
light of the analysis below on the voters as distinguished from the
population, this statement is suspect - unless, of course, the term
"people" does not include those so rejected. So, too, must one
analyze Washington's reference, in his Farewell Address, to the
amending procedure in the Constitution, i.e., "If in the opinion of
laration referred to the "authority of the good people of these states," with the last
word apparently a Congressional amendment. J. HAZELTON, supra note 20, at page
facing 144.
37 For comparison, see note 19 supra.
3 8 The quote may be found at paragraph 5 of the Declaration of Independence.
89 During the first half of 1776 various attempts to organize some form of local
government had culminated in a Provincial Conference which proposed that a Pro-
vincial Convention be called "for the express purpose of forming a new Government
in this province." J. HAzELTON, supra note 20, at 190. This is the Convention here
referred to. It may not be amiss to note that on June 30, 1775, the Pennsylvania As-
sembly set up a "Committee of Safety," consisting of 25 persons, with Benjamin Frank-
lin as President. IV PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 636 n. (J. Hazard ed. 1853). This
Committee thereafter functioned somewhat secretly, and on July 2, 1776, prepared a
public address because they "perceive[d] lately that both Confidence and Authority
[in them) are considerably shaken and impaired... [as) not resting on a foundation
altogether popular .... " Minutes of the Council of Safety of the Province of Pennsyl-
vania, in 10 MITUS OF THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM THE
ORGANIZATION TO THB TERMINATION OF THE PROPRIETARY GovERNMNT 623
(1852) [hereinafter cited as MINUTES OF THE PROVINcIAL COUNCIL]. On July 6th
they received the Declaration of Independence from Congress and, as per the forwarded
request, caused it to be publicized. Id. at 635. The Provincial Convention was elected,
with Franklin its President, and met. Id. at 654. During its deliberations it appointed
a "Council of Safety" which replaced the Committee. Id. at 653.
10 J. IAZELTON, supra note 20, at 192 (emphasis in original). In 1776 John
Adams wrote: "When! before the present epocha, had three millions of people full
power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and happiest government
that human wisdom can contrive?" Quoted in B. BAILYN, supra note 3, at 272-73.
See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), which states that "The people of
the United States erected their constitutions or forms of government . ... " Id. at 388-
89.
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the People, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional
powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amend-
ment in the way which the Constitution designates."'" The people
do not directly enter into the amending procedure under article V
of the Constitution, except through representatives. This is so
whether proposed by Congress and ratified by the State legislatures,
or, in the alternative process, proposed by State conventions; 2 the
"opinion of the People" is therefore not directly manifested, and
this was especially true in Washington's time when only a mi-
nority of people could vote, as disclosed below.
I. PRIOR AND CONTEMPORARY VIEWS
The composition of "the people" in 1776 may be examined
from many points of view.4" Limitations of space preclude all but
41 George Washington's Farewell Address, Sept. 19, 1796, in 35 THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 214, 229 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). The same criticism
holds true for Lincoln who, in his First Inaugural Address of March 4, 1861, said:
"This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever
they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitu-
tional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember, or overthrow
it .... 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN, supra note 3, at 269. It may be also
noted that Lincoln's first use of "people" here is to the totality of inhabitants, not to the
few who are voters; his first "they" superficially refers to this same totality but when
connected with and to the second "they," and read in conjunction with "existing gov-
ernment" and the rest of the sentence, the original term has now been limited, changed,
or replaced - in any event, the two sentences do not refer to the same "people."
420n this alternative method of amending, see Forkosch, The Alternative Amend-
ing Clause in Article V: Reflections and Suggestions, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1053 (1967).
43 E.g., the overall distribution by continent as of 1750 and 1800 discloses that
North and Central America increased from 6 to 15 million, compared with that of
Europe from 140 to 188 million. W. WILLCOX, STUDIES IN AMERICAN DEMOGRA-
PHY 41, 43 (1940). The rural-urban proportion in the United States as of 1790 was
94.9:5.1, 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 367-68 (1956), and the largest city had only
some 50,000 inhabitants. However, 19 COLLIERS'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 252 (L. Shores ed.
1962), gives the 1790 census population as 3,929,000, of whom four-fifths were white
and the rest Negro (this proportion fell thereafter), and W. SOLBERG, THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN STATES 409
(1958), giving the 1790 federal census as 3,637,881, of whom 2,897,804 were free
whites, 58,243 free others, and 681,854 slaves.
The preceding figures may be somewhat compared with those of Great Britain.
With the growth of towns, a phenomenon of the first phase of the industrial revolution,
the population grew from an estimate of 8 million in 1760, to 10 million in 1801
when the first census was taken. P. GREGG, A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
BRITAIN 1760-1960, at 62,582 (5th ed. 1962). According to Adam Smith, "[sler-
vants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every
great political society .... 1 A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 80 (5th ed. 1930).
It may be remarked that "the people" in England had, by the turn of the century, been
subjected to a variety of injustices, e.g., the Poor Law, the Law of Settlement, the Game
Laws, and the Enclosure Acts. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
101, 107-08 (1930) (Game Laws); 2 id. at 460 (Poor Law); 6 id. at 351-53 (Law of
Settlement); W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW 40
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a few narrow choices, sufficient, nevertheless, to permit inferences
and conclusions. The framework within which the examination is
undertaken encompasses the colonies in their own social, political,
and economic setting, and, separately, this totality in its relation to
the mother country4 The early settlements were proprietary or
charter ones, i.e., privately and commercially45 sponsored and
owned,4" so that little Crown supervision occurred; later, however,
the King recognized them as assets worthy of his attention and, un-
der the mercantilist economic philosophy of the day, these outlying
possessions were to contribute to the wealth and prosperity of Eng-
land 7 The years which thus ordinarily only brought chronologi-
cal changes now brought conceptual and corresponding social and
political ones as well. The several aspects of "the people" to be
surveyed therefore require a degree of analysis in some depth, how-
(1927) (Enclosure Acts). Not only had the peasantry been destroyed, but the condition
of the new wage laborer was settled for the next century. See P. GREG, supra, ch. 1.
See generally J. HAMMOND, THE VILLAGE LABOURER 1760-1832 (1911); 2 E. LIP-
SON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND ch. 3 (4th ed. 1947). Professor Ogg
writes of 17th-century Europe that "[i]n the apportionment of states the populace were
regarded as little better than chattels, even humanitarian Grotius regarding subject
populations in this light" D. OGG, EUROPE IN Tim SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 2 (8th
ed. 1961).
4 4 See generally 1 H. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY xxvii (1904).
4 5 See C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 3-9 (rev. ed. 1931); 1 C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 28-52 (1934).
4 6The very liberal Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges, granted by William Penn
in 1701, deserves more than a cursory reference, but considerations of space militate
against this. For our purposes it is seemingly a mass of either contradictions, broad-
enings, or misunderstandings. See, e.g., its opening paragraphs and subsequent limit-
ing words (given in eight listed items here omitted).
In the language so used the original "Freemen and Planters" of 1683 were first
expanded to "Freeman, Planters and Adventurers;' but by 1700 the earlier charter was
not suitable to "the Inhabitants," although Penn now says that six of seven "Freemen"
had, in effect, petitioned for a more liberal one. Nevertheless, a new charter of lib-
erties, "better adapted" to the "said Inhabitants," was to be given to "all Freemen,
Planters and Inhabitants," to be held and enjoyed by those again named forever.
There is no limiting term in this, i.e., Negroes, Indians, indentured, are all "Inhabit-
ants," if not freemen - at least so it would appear. Nevertheless, only believers in
Christ could serve in the government, and then, apparently, only "Freemen" could
choose an assembly, albeit the composition of this body continually was spoken of as
consisting of "Persons" - undoubtedly these latter were to be freemen, picked by
freemen, but no such words of limitation appeared. For example, throughout the
document "person" or "persons" appear, and in paragraphs VI through VIII these need
not be freemen, assuming otherwise qualified. So, too, in the proviso, which in effect
warns the freemen that unless they so act within 3 years "the Inhabitants" are then
so authorized. The Charter of Privileges to the Province and Counties, in 1 MINUTEs
OF THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 39, at 56-62.
4 7 See, e.g., 4 C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY ix,
348 (1934); 2 E. IIPSON, supra note 43, at 154-206.
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ever minimal. Initially an early aspect of the colonization of
America is mentioned, and then the demographic and suffrage as-
pects are considered.
In Massachusetts, to treat only this colony and its early days,
religion, and not trade, was its founding raison d'etre,48 and the
Puritan ethic "overrode all opposition, legal and otherwise .... ,,
The colony began as a sort of voluntary joint-stock agreement or
organization amongst three groups of interests," but ultimately the
merchant adventurers' desire for profits"' resulted in a charter trans-
formation of "the New England Company into the Massachusetts
Bay Company, an incorporated body or body politic, with 'ample
power to govern and rule all his Majesty's subjects that reside within
the limits of our plantation."' 52 During the next 30 years the new
group "had established itself so firmly on New England soil as to
defy all attempts to dislodge it," and ultimately it changed into
"a full-fledged, quasi-independent, self-governing religious commu-
nity."5" During this charter period and the increase in trade and
population, however, a centralized leadership developed even though
"[there was nothing in the charter to warrant such concentration
of control."54  That is, the early settlers had approved their officials
4 8 E.g., the Mayflower Compact, signed by all 41 male passengers, the women being
excluded, was entered into (as its opening sentence, after the preliminaries, states) "for
the glory of God, and advancement of the Christian Faith." THE STORY OF THE IL-
GRIM FATHERS 409-10 (E. Arber ed. 1897).
It was because of his then-heretical view that God did not require religious uni-
formity (and conformity) but that all were entitled to worship as they pleased (as a
natural right), that Roger Williams' religious tolerance irked the Massachusetts authori-
ties and eventually caused him, in 1644, to write The Bloudy Tenant of Persecution
and go to England to obtain a charter for the Providence Plantations. Thomas Jeffer-
son's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, introduced in the Virginia House of
Delegates in June 1779, eventually was enacted in 1786 with James Madison's help.
Both Williams and Jefferson, in their respective works, generalized about all individ-
uals and all men, without making distinctions (although Jefferson's bill did, in its sec-
tion 1, speak also of "citizens").
49 1 C. ANDREWS, supra note 47, at 430; see id. at 462. Noble feels that "the point
of view of the modern American historian is directly related to the world view of the
English Puritans who came to Massachusetts... ." D. NOBLE, HISTORIANS AGAINST
HISTORY 3 (1965). Parenthetically, even Noble uses generalizations (and justifiably)
in writing of "the people, the sleeping giant [who] awoke to strike out in blind fury
against its foreign corrupters." Id. at 137.
50 1 C. ANDREWS, supra note 47, at 264-65. In the settlement later founded the
Pilgrims were "a minority as to numbers" but "were in the main a homogeneous group,
both in social rating and in religious views and purpose." Id. at 275.
51 Id. at 345.
52 Id. at 365-66 (quoting from the Massachusetts Colonial Records). The merger
was apparently on March 4, 1629. Id. at 373. "In its main features, the charter was
manifestly modeled upon that of the Virginia Company of 1612...... Id. at 369.
53 Id. at 430.
54 Id. at 432.
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by a form of consent, and while the charter permitted some such
arrangement, the geographical scattering of the increasing popula-
tion did not comport with any government by a few. 5  Also, the
charter
[aldmitted a measure of popular control in providing for four
general courts, meeting every quarter, at each of which "freemen"
or members were to be present, constituting the generality, for
the purpose of making laws and admitting other "freemen," and
... electing the officials of the company. Thus far no such gen-
eral courts had been held, for probably the only "freemen" in
America were those that made up the court of assistants. If there-
fore the requirements of the charter were to be met, "freemen"
must be created at once.... [A]t one such court... the general-
ity appear under the name "people," who are mentioned as in at-
tendance, giving approval by "erection of hands." This was clear-
ly irregular and what we have is not a general court but a mass
meeting. The "people" were not authorized by the charter to at-
tend _ an irregularity which had to be remedied. Consequently
an invitation was extended to all such as desired to become "free-
men" to hand in their names.
... As no qualification for membership was imposed at this
time, except that which the word itself implies, it would look as if
in this first difficult year, when death and distress were rampant
and many dangers threatened the colony, the leaders were willing
to do anything to ensure stability. Some of the old-timers ...
refused to become freemen, and a few of them were eventually
shipped back to England as undesirable persons. But before seven
months had elapsed ... the whole, idea of freemanship changed.
At a general court, held on May 18, 1631, Winthrop was continued
as governor and the "freemen" or "commons," as they are called
in the records, or "freemen of the commons" as they appear in
Winthrop's journal, were confronted with an ironclad oath, and the
momentous decision was reached that henceforth "noe man shalbe
admitted to the freedom of this body polliticke, but such as are
members of the churches within the limitts of the same."56
Professor Andrews castigates this "flagrant violation of the char-
ter" but feels that it
was in accord with Winthrop's profound conviction that it was
for the good of all that power should be kept in the hands of those
whose Christian calling it was to govern and that their number
should remain as small as possible. He always stood in dread of
a plebeian tyranny - control by the inferior sort - and was con-
55 See id.
561d. at 434-35 (emphasis added). Professor Andrews writes: "The historian
Hutchinson speaks of this as 'a most extraordinary order or law,' a deprivation of civil
privileges which had it occurred in England by act of parliament 'might very well
have been the first in a roll of grievances.' It was probably the most flagrant violation
of the charter that had occurred up to this time." Id. at 436.
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vinced that the "people" were not to be trusted with the election
of so important an official as the governor. 7
This continuing experience of proprietary charter governments
now becoming colonies and self-governing bodies is reflected greatly
in America as a whole."8 "The people" in early Massachusetts were
apparently not synonymous with those who could rule, regulate,
and retain, for these latter were a restricted group; "the people"
might thus be said to include all humans, i.e., the general popula-
tion, but these were now to be classified in terms of religion, free-
manship and so on. While Negroes do not enter the early Massa-
chusetts picture, Indians certainly did; nevertheless, it is not only
significant that nowhere do these aborigines appear in relation to
the right to vote, own land, worship, et cetera, but no mention of
them is made even negatively in any early records examined - it
was just assumed that Indians were not included even in "the peo-
ple" of the colony!
Demographically, the population of the English continental
colonies in 1750 was estimated at about 1,200,000, as compared
with Europe's 140 million, 9 but by 1800 the population of the
colonies had increased to 5,300,000 as compared with Europe's 188
million."0 "The tremendous rise in population . . . made the col-
onies far less dependent on the mother country than they had been
in the early days."6  For 1750 one demographer accepts figures
of 1,040,000 whites and 220,000 Negroes which, by 1787, had in-
creased to 2,776,000 and 520,000 respectively. The first federal
57 Id. at 438-39. See also id. at 441-50 on the subsequent addition to the powers
of freemen, e.g., not only in elections and taxation, but also in legislation. And on the
later division of the general court into two separate bodies, see id. at 450-53.
58 See, e.g., 2 C. ANDREWs, supra note 47, at 195-379.
59 W. WILLCOX, supra note 43, at 41. See also J. SANDERS, EARLY A.MERICAN
HISTORY 381 (1938), where the author states: "By 1660 the population of the colonies
was 88,000 or less, by 1700 probably 289,000, by 1750 over 1,200,000, and by 1775
more than 2,500,000." Indians, of course, are ordinarily omitted from all statistics.
60 W. WILLCOX, supra note 43, at 43. The United States then did not include
Louisiana or Florida, which respectively had 40,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. By 1850
the greater United States population was 23,200,000. Id. at 44.
6 1 G. WILLIAMS, THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
193 (1966). See C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 182-83 (rev. ed. 1931).
6 2 E. GREENE & V. HARRINGTON, AMERICAN POPULATION BEFORE THE FED-
ERAL CENSUS OF 1790, at 5, 8 (1932). Local breakdowns for various years are here
interesting. For example, in South Carolina there were a total of 7,150 inhabitants in
1703, divided as follows: freemen, 1,460; free women, 940; white men servants, 110;
white women servants, 90; and white children, 1,200. The "Slaves" included: Negro
men, 1,500; Negro women, 900; Indian men, 100; Indian women, 150; Negro chil-
dren, 600; and Indian children, 100. Id. at 173. By 1751 there were 25,000 whites
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census of 1790 disclosed the total number of people in the new
nation, 3 in terms of free whites, other free persons, and slaves,6" to
be 3,893,635, broken down as follows: free white males below
16 years of age, 791,848; over 16, including heads of families,
1,541,263; all other free persons, 59,150; and slaves, 694,280.65
The returns for the Southwest Territory were respectively as fol-
lows: 10,277; 6,271; 15,365; 361; and 3,417; for a total of
35,691.6
During this latter half of the 18th century the whites included67
the apprentice and the indentured (or covenanted) servant, the lat-
ter being somewhat different from the corresponding black, as the
indentured servant's status was a temporary one, i.e., service was
for a period of contractual or customary time sufficient to pay the
cost of overseas transportation." Labor's continuing scarcity" con-
and 40,000 Negroes, and the first Census of 1790 disclosed a total of free white males,
females, and other free persons as 141,979, while "Slaves" numbered 107,094. Id. at
175-76. For national and religious compositions see J. SANDERS, supra note 59, ch. 22.
The author also remarks that "[t]here were both free and unfree laboring classes in the
colonies, the second designation covering servants of different kinds and slaves." Id.
at 388-89.
63 For Adam Smith's views on such population growth in colonies see 2 A. S.TH,
.rupra note 43, bk. 4, ch. 7, pts. 2-3. For his views on the relative political power be-
tween England and the American colonists according to population, and then when
"the produce of American taxation" was included, see id. pt. 3.
6 4 See also note 43 supra. Under a British law, 4 Geo. 1, c. 11 (1717), certain
classes of criminals could be transported to the colonies for terms of not less than 7
years. For the remainder of the colonial period after 1717, some 50,000 convicts were
so condemned. F. GREENE, PROVINCIAL AMERICA 1690-1740, at 237 (1905). At the
close of the 17th century slaves accounted for a small minority of the population ex-
cept for South Carolina; the development of the African slave trade brought about
25,000 slaves annually to America between 1698 and 1707, and by 1750 there were
about 300,000 slaves in the colonies, a rate of increase at least twice that of the whites.
This increase brought legislation carefully defining status, and one Virginia law classed
Negroes, for certain purposes, as realty. Id. at 238-39.
65 RTURN OF THE WHOLE NUImBE OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DIs-
TRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (W. Duane ed. 1802). Others, e.g., Rossiter, accept
the Census of 1790, without more, as disclosing "a population of 3,929,214, of whom
681,834 were Negro slaves." C. ROSSITER, 1787, THE GRAND CONVENTION 23
(1966).
6 6 RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH[N THE SEVERAL DIs-
TRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 65, at 52 notes that "[t]here are several
captains who have not as yet returned" figures for their districts.
6 7 
"Conspicuous among the causes for colonization, in that it probably influenced
the largest number of those who settled in North America, was the desire for land and
an opportunity to make a home for wife and children." 1 C. ANDREWS, supra note 47,
at 54.
6SThe indentures were able to be sold, traded, disposed of by will, or otherwise
treated as chattels, for the term of service remaining, so that redemptioners as a form
of property were analogous to Negroes, e.g., the fugitive servant problem was the sub-
ject of statutes and judicial decisions upholding the property right, and of aid to the
runaway by sympathizers. The later constitutional provision in U.S. CONST. art. IV,
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duced to the influx of indentured and convict labor, and also
spawned the slave trade's phenomenal growth. However, though
such whites could be recognized as fellow Christians, temporarily
subjected to a contractual status, whereas a Negro slave was dif-
ferentiated by race and treated as an inferior human being, their
political rights" of suffrage were nil." For example, the Virginia
Company's constitution of 1621 permitted what amounted then to
almost universal suffrage, 2 but by 1762 not only were freehold
qualifications there in effect but also no "servant by indenture, cove-
nant, or otherwise" was allowed to vote,73 nor was any "feme, sole
or covert, infant under the age of twenty-one, recusant, convict, or
any person convicted in Great Britain or Ireland, during the time
§ 2, cd. 3 is traceable to this background, and the Northwest Ordinance Art. VI, in 3
NORTHWEST TERRITORY LAws 1795, at III, XII, contained a like clause. See gen-
erally 1 L. HACKER, THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION 97-102 (1947); 2
E. LIPSON, supra note 43, at 159; IL MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY
AMERICA ch. 9 (1946). Lipson states: "The stream of emigrants which flowed from
England in the seventeenth century, comprised three main categories. Some went...
[for religious reasons,] '. . . others out of necessity, and lastly, some involuntarily as
being delinquents.'" 2 E. LIPSON, supra note 43, at 159. This background of appren-
ticeship continued into the first part of the 19th century. See, e.g., J. KROtJT & D. Fox,
THE COMPLETION OF INDEPENDENCE 1790-1830, at 22-23 (1944). To some extent
convicts might also be included in such a temporary status. Greene & Harrington's
1775 overall figures for Maryland disclose a total of whites (men, women, boys, and
girls) as 107,209, of whom 98,357 were free, 6,871 servants, and 1,981 convicts; for
Negroes, the total was 46,356. E. GREENE & V. HARRINGTON, supra note 62, at 126.
69 "There is seldom any want relief; because labor is deare, vis., 2s., and sometimes
2s. 6d. a day for a day labourer, and provision cheap." Report by Governor Leete of
Connecticut to the Committee for Trade and Plantations in 1680, quoted in R MORRIS,
supra note 68, at 45.
70 Here differentiated from legal rights, e.g., their ability to sue for freedom (de-
spite the heavy risks incurred) because of the expiration of contract service, attainment
of majority, and so on, and their ability not only to testify against their master but to
be a witness in their own behalf.
71 This does not mean that England was any better. Professor Andrews comments
that even after the "glorious" Revolution of 1689 in England, "Heavy disabilities and
penalties lay upon Roman Catholics, Unitarians, and Jews. Even Dissenters were
barred from the borough offices ...." C. ANDREws, supra note 61, at 189. The au-
thor calls the new ruling group a "capitalistic aristocracy, which for many generations
had supplanted the older aristocracy of the feudal type, controlled the voting, made the
laws, and determined the policies of the government." Id. at 190.
72 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 112 (W.W. Hening comp. 1823).
This ordinance of King James created "two supreme councils in Virginia," the General
Assembly (or popularly elected one) to consist of the (appointed) Council of State plus
"two burgesses out of every town, hundred, or other particular plantation, to be respec-
tively chosen by the inhabitants ... reserving to the governor always a negative voice."
However, "inhabitants" certainly did not include women, or men bound to service.
A. McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN
AMERICA 21 (1905). Therefore this famous first representative assembly in the New
World did not include all actual inhabitants in its voting "inhabitants."
73 5 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 72, at 205.
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for which he is transported, nor any free negro, mulatto or Indian,
although such persons be freeholders .... ""
Other and earlier restrictions upon voting were likewise either
universally continued, or almost so, among the Thirteen Colonies.75
These included, for example, sex,"6 age (at least 21), race," reh-
74 7 id. at 519. Bishop feels that "On account of the small number of inhabitants
[ia the early colonies], it was at first hardly necessary, and perhaps not advisable, to
limit the elective franchise to any particular class of individuals ...... Bishop, His-
tory of Elections it the Aaerican Colonies, in 3 STUDIEs IN HISroRY, ECONOMICS
AND PUBLIC LAw 46 (1893). H. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY xxviii-xxix (1924), feels that the early chartered colonies gave
way to the system of royal provinces; this may therefore really account for the later
restrictions, i.e., the economic need and its transition to the political requirements.
750ne writer feels "that English customs and precedents exercised a determining
influence upon the qualifications of voters in the colonies .... It is probable, under the
prevailing seventeenth and eighteenth century political ideals, that a restricted suffrage
would have been adopted throughout the colonies even if the English government had
not endeavored to obtain the same end." A. MCKINLEY, supra note 72, at 484-85.
C. Bishop believes that such colonial restrictions were "due solely to the interference of
the [English] Crown .... Bishop, supra note 74, at 72.
However, although pre-Revolutionary America was so restricted, so that "at the end
of the Revolutionary period [it] fell far short of complete democracy," Jameson never-
theless writes that "the right of suffrage was much extended ....." J. JAMESON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 18 (Beacon ed. 1966).
7 6 Women were universally excluded, even if freeholders, and it was not until the
adoption of the 19th amendment in 1920 that sex was no longer a negative factor in the
right to vote.
7 7 Bishop, supra note 74, at 51, writes that "Race qualifications were not prescribed
by statute, except in the southern colonies. I know of no law that would prevent an
Indian or a negro, if otherwise qualified, from voting in the modern colonies." How-
ever, custom may sometimes be stronger than positive law, see, e.g., C. ALLEN, LAW
IN THE MAKING ch. 1 (7th ed. 1964); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROcESs 58-62 (1921), and the colonial wars of the 17th and 18th centuries always
involved Indians - the outrages visited upon the settlers by the Indians did not favor
political fraternization. See, e.g., I-L OSGOOD, supra note 74, at xxviii passim. Also
the Conspiracy of Pontiac, a confederation of Indian tribes led by Pontiac to drive the
colonists to the sea, must have had a similar effect G. WILLIAMS, supra note 61, at
194. A. MCKINLEY, supra note 72, at 474, states that
A racial distinction arose naturally in the colonies possessing a large negro
slave population. Apparently the first law upon the subject is that of North
Carolina of 1715 which excluded negroes, mulattoes and Indians from the
franchise. In 1716 South Carolina inserted the word "white" into her elec-
tion law;, while Virginia adopted the phraseology of North Carolina in 1723,
and Georgia followed with the word "white" in 1761. The North Carolina
statute was repealed in 1734-5 and the racial restriction does not again ap-
pear during the colonial period.
Mrs. Catterali's collection of cases reflects the poor social and legal condition of the
slaves, e.g., they could not cohabit or intermarry with the whites, could not testify
where whites were involved, and could be tried for their crimes without benefit of jury.
2 H. CATIERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NE-
GRO 11 (1926). Catterall also includes cases on Indians. Id. at 77. One Georgia
case finds a Negro, Dickson, "Guilty of the Murder of a free Negroe ...." 3 id. at 6.
See also J. JAMESON, supra note 75, at 25-26 (post-Revolutionary actions by States to
free Negroes).
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gion,7 8 morals or good character," nationality,80 property81 qualifi-
cations,8 2 freemanship,83 and qualifications akin to the English bor-
78 For colonial religious background in the 17th century see, e.g., 2 H. OSGOOD,
supra note 44, ch. 13; H. OSGOOD, supra note 74, pt. 2, chs. 10-11, at 76-142; id. pt. 3,
chs. 1-2, at 407-90. See also Cousins, " In God We Trust," in THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
AND IDEAS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1958).
Parliament forbade the naturalization of Catholic aliens in the colonies after 1740,
which had been anticipated by New York and Massachusetts several years earlier, and
the colonies generally enforced some degree of religious discrimination, e.g., Quakers
were unable to vote (oath-taking was involved) except in Rhode Island, Baptists were
likewise impugned, and Catholics were generally disfranchised (or voting was limited
to Protestants) as were Jews (e.g., New York and South Carolina, and being too few in
numbers to be elsewhere specified). See generally A. MCKINLEY, supra note 72; cf.
Bishop, supra note 74, at 52-53. See also id. at 56-64.
The Puritans were apparently the dominating religious force in the colonies at that
time. See, e.g., 1 C. ANDREWS, supra note 47, at 431. There seems to be a logical
inconsistency between the Puritans' view that since "God actively works to transform
all spheres of life, including 'life in the world' with all its ramifications," so that they
are therefore compelled to an "involvement in the political and social life of the com-
munity of their time," R. MONK, JOHN WESLEY: His PURITAN HERITAGE 250 (1966),
and their actual practice, e.g., as given by C. ANDREWS, supra note 61, at 431, especially
in their disenfranchising so many of the Lord's people. The answer to this last, of
course, is that only they were such people.
79 "Moral qualifications,' says Bishop, "were insisted on only in New England,
though Virginia denied the franchise to" convicts even though freeholders. Bishop,
supra note 74, at 53; see note 74 supra. On the continuing exclusion of felons, and the
judicial upholding of the power by the States, see discussion in Green v. Board of Elec-
tions, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967).
80 Bishop, svpra note 74, at 52-53, says such political qualifications "were rarely
prescribed by statute." He instances a few requiring voters to be born in the mother
country or naturalized here.
81 This is not to he confused with, or limited to, realty, e.g., a freehold. Freeholders,
of course, were property owners, but these were not interchangeable terms as non-
freeholders could also generally vote. See, e.g., 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 215-16 (1911) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND
RECORDS] where Gorham of Massachusetts said:
[HIe had never seen any inconvenience from allowing such as were not
freeholders to vote, though it had long been tried. The elections in Phila.
N. York & Boston where the Merchants, & Mechanics vote are at least as
good as those made by freeholders only . . . . Mr. Mercer [Md.] did not
object so much to an election by the people at large including such as were
not freeholders ....
See also J. JAMESON, supra note 77, at 18-19; note 184 infra.
8 2 See A. McKINLEY, supra note 72, at 478-81, where the author indicates the
rather extensive use of this requirement from 1665 to 1760, discussing it in terms of
its various forms and requirements. See also Bishop, supra note 74, at 69-90; K.
PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (1918). On the use
of property qualifications in the 18th century see C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTER-
PRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION ch. 4 (1913) and sources cited therein. On the
English background, see C. ANDREWS, supra note 61, at 191; text accompanying notes
86, 88 infra.
This requirement did not die with the Revolution, e.g., "Except in Boston, which
... retained its town meeting until 1822, those who had property enough to vote elected
... [officials], just as in England ...." J. KROUT & D. Fox, supra note 68, at 22. It
is suggested that even the Boston town meetings were restricted in that other types of
qualifications or requirements were imposed, e.g., religion and age. See also debates in
Congress on the proposed 15th amendment, in A. AvINs, THE RECONSTRUCTION
THE "PEOPLE" IN THE PREAMBLE
ough franchise.84 The population, as given above in terms of vari-
ous categories of people restricted for purposes of suffrage by the
requirements just mentioned, enables one author to conclude as
follows:
In Virginia in several elections between 1744 and 1772 there
appeared to be about nine per cent. of the white population actual-
ly participating as electors. In New York City, in the elections of
1735, 1761 and 1769 the actual voters numbered about eight per
cent. of the population. In Pennsylvania the tax-list figures give
only potential voters, but they show about eight per cent. of the
rural population qualified for the suffrage, and only two per cent.
in the city of Philadelphia, a condition quite in contrast to that of
New York City. In New England the actual voters appear to be
less proportionately than in the middle and southern colonies.
Massachusetts, for instance, shows only one person in fifty as tak-
ing part in elections, and Connecticut, in elections immediately
preceding the Revolution, had about the same proportion. In
Rhode Island the freemen or potential voters numbered only nine
per cent. of the population. These figures are entirely too few,
and too scattered in time and territory, to justify any accurate gen-
AMmMENTs' DEBATES 390-91 (1967), that the disqualifications among the States to
disfranchise then included, e.g., "nativity, color, education, property, or creed." Id. at
391, col. I (Mr. Bingham).
Property qualifications have not yet disappeared from the American scene. See,
e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 379 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1967), and it
is only since the 24th amendment that voting poll taxes (federal offices) were elimi-
nated. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (State offices).
Apart from voting, such requirements continue, e.g., property qualifications for (blue
ribbon) jury trial service, People v. Fay, 332 U.S. 261, 266 (1947), although in this
case a factual loophole excused the Court from discussing the alleged unconstitution-
ality of this requirement. Id. at 276. The dissenters apparently approved of it, id. at
299, and one lower New York court has specifically upheld the statutory necessity "to
have a minimal ownership in something real or personal to invest a person with the
privilege of performing a vital public function, such as being a member of the Grand
Jury or trial jury .... People v. Ruppert, 53 Misc. 2d 845, 848-49, 279 N.Y.S.2d
895, 898 (West County Ct. 1967), reference to "trial jury" in this case being obiter. Cf.
Landes v. Town of North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417 (1967) (property qualification
for public office). It may be noted also that by 1967, ch. 49, the N.Y. Judiciary Law
§ 596, subd. 3, was removed; that clause required jurors (or their spouses) in New
York City counties to be worth at least $250 in realty or personalty.
83 E.g., in corporations, as was Rhode Island, after 1762, 3 months' probation
was required after proposal before acceptance as a freeman could occur. See Bishop,
supra note 74, at 46-51, 92-97; the brief analysis of early Massachusetts given in text
accompanying notes 48-57 supra. Professor Andrews writes that in Massachusetts
"freemen, [were] always a minority in every town and in the colony as a whole, who
alone voted for governor, magistrates, and deputies, and thus represented neither the
towns nor the people but only themselves." 1 C. ANDREWS, supra note 47, at 437 (em-
phasis added).
84 See A. MCKINLEY, supra note 74, at 482-83. It is not amiss here to comment
that the rotten borough system has been rejected, at least judicially, in the United
States. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. The Forty-Fourth
General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). But cf. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231(1966). Bishop also discusses "Miscellaneous" qualifications, e.g., persons under guard-
ianship. Bishop, supra note 74, at 90-92.
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eralization from them. The potential voters seem to vary from
one-sixth to one-fiftieth of the population, and the actual voters
show almost an equal variation; Massachusetts and Connecticut
showing at times only two per cent. of actual voters among a
population where perhaps sixteen per cent were qualified electors,
and New York City and Virginia showing a far larger proportion
of eight per cent. of the population as actual voters. At best, how-
ever, the colonial elections called forth both relatively and abso-
lutely only a small fraction of the present percentage of voters.8 5
One may quote Burke's views in the period after the Glorious
Revolution of 1689 in England, and find these pathetically appli-
cable before and after the American Revolution of 1776, that "our
representation has been found perfectly adequate to all purposes for
which a representation of the population can be desired or devised;"
and, as one historian remarks, this English statesman "could boast
further that the House of Lords was wholly and the House of Com-
mons mainly composed for the defense of heriditary property."86
In other words, "the people" of whom Burke spoke was a minority
group selected from the entire population. 7 The middle class mind
of England was then
not progressive. It was imbedded in tradition and dominated by
fixed ideas of political and social relations. To this class alone
belonged the right to rule; the poor had nothing to do but to obey.
... Their notion of the liberty won in the great and glorious revo-
lution was liberty for themselves, not a general franchise for all
the people, which in their minds would have transformed liberty
into a plebeian tyranny.88
85 A. MCKINLEY, supra note 74, at 487-80. The universality of this restrictive
feature (at least for Western Nations) is disclosed by the following:
In the France of Louis XVIII, fewer than 100,000 of a population of
30,000,000 could vote; the government of Louis Phillipe only doubled the
electorate; the Republic of 1848 soon surrendered to Louis Bonaparte. In
England the Reform Act of 1832 was more concerned with reapportionment
than suffrage and, in its attempts to make the franchise more uniform, actu-
ally disfranchised some voters; by the time Marx wrote the Communist Mani-
festo, the Chartist movement had failed; and the first real extension of the
suffrage in England did not come until 1867, the publication date of Das
Kapital. Greenbaum, John Dewey Views Karl Marx, 42 SOCrAL SCI. 195,
200 (1967).
86 C. ANDREws, supra note 61, at 192.
87 It should be noted that England at that time did not have Indians, slaves, and
so on as a large minority of the total population, and it was not the host for convicts
and indentured servants in the nature and profusion of those sailing to the new land.
88 C. ANDREws, supra note 61, at 191. This 17th and also 18th century view may,
by parallelism of reasoning, be said to be a continuation of the 13th century approach.
The earlier revolution which culminated in the Magna Carta of 1215 (and subsequent
reconfirmations) had been occasioned by John's rebellious barons, a most definite mi-
nority of aristocrats. This contract, or bargain, excluded the vast majority of the
English people, who were serfs. The nobles acted to protect their own interests albeit
the principles now established were subsequently applied (twisted?) "into a statement
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This reaction against such "plebeian tyranny" in England was re-
flected in the United States, although not in identical form, both in
the North and the South. In the latter, an aristocratic and landed
gentry, with entailed large estates, continued for generations to pos-
sess an assured economic, social, and political position, whereas in
the former, trade was beginning its eventual dominance and there
was vertical class movement with an overall middle class outlook.
The difficulties in transportation and communication perpetuated
this division. 9
Even during the period while the Articles of Confederation
were in use the restrictive features mentioned above were perpetu-
ated even when the Congress obtained cessions of Western Terri-
tories from New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut
and enacted its famous ordinance of 1787.0 In effect Madison
commented upon this division when, in The Federalist No. 10 he
wrote, in 1787, of the "diversity in the faculties of men," the pro-
tection of which "is the first object of government," and from which
"ensues a division of the society" into "ftlhose who -hold and those
who are without property ... ." A "pure democracy" was no cure,
he felt, "for the mischiefs of faction," and he therefore recom-
mended a republican (representative) form of government so as to
"secure the public good and private rights against the danger of
such a faction," and also to render a majority "unable to concert
and carry into effect schemes of oppression.""
of the liberties of the whole English people and the privileges of a parliament ...
F. MONAGHAN, HERITAGE OF FREEDOM 6 (1947).
89 See, e.g., 1 J.T. ADAMS, TIM MARCH OF DEMOCRACY 90-99 (1932). Jeffer-
son's comment that 'The inhabitants of the commercial cities are as different in senti-
ment and character from the country people as any two distinct nations, and are clam-
orous against the order of [Republicani things established by the agricultural interest"
may also be noted. THE JEF1ESONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 687 (J. Foley ed. 1900).
Jameson writes that when the Revolution began there were only five towns in the
entirety of the colonies of more than 8,000 inhabitants, "and only two or three per cent
of the people lived in: them. From the pastures of Maine to the rice-fields of Georgia,
America was almost absolutely rural, and her people were almost wholly devoted to
agriculture." J. JAMESON, supra note 75, at 28.
90 E.g., the 1785 statute provided that when "five thousand male inhabitants of full
age" resided in each district, and so proved to the Governor, they were to receive author-
ity to elect representatives, etc., provided, however, that an elector possess "a freehold
in fifty acres of land in the district," and also be either "a citizen of one of the states
and... resident in the district," or else have 2 years' such residence. The legislature
(consisting of the representatives, separate legislative council, and the Governor) were
to elect a nonvoting delegate to Congress. Additionally, there were appended a series
of articles (on rights, and so on) to "be considered as Artides of compact between the
Original States and the people and States in the said territory .... 32 JOURNALS OF
THE CONIrENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 337-38, 339-40 (Library of Congress ed.
1936).
91 TImE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 55-58 (National Howe Library ed. 1937) (Madi-
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The social, religious, and economic structure of these charter
and later Crown Colonies was significantly altered in the century
and a half preceding the Revolutionary War. Until the Great
Awakening of the early 18th century92 the original Puritan stric-
tures had prevailed,93 but became somewhat liberalized by the im-
pact of economic prosperity and the consequent world outlook; the
movement stimulated education and placed "greater stress upon
righteous living and a corresponding reduction of emphasis upon
creeds, doctrines, and ecclesiastical formalities. It appears also that
humanitarianism and the view that life has an essential worth and
dignity transcending the forms of artificial aristocracy were encour-
aged. Democracy was thus stimulated."94  The English heritage
of a degree of political liberty, achieved during the course of five
centuries of continuing struggle, was not unknown to the Colonists;
they brought with them a fierce pride in being Englishmen, entitled
to all these freedoms and rights, and at first did not seek to cut their
imperial ties. 5 But they also brought with them English folkways,
son). Schlesinger quotes the 1774 Boston Committee of Correspondence as suggesting
that "[t]here must be both a political and commercial congress," i.e., amongst the
many suggestions which resulted in the First Continental Congress. The author dis-
cusses the first meetings of this Congress and points up "[t]he radicals [who] threw off
their mask" and pushed through "an extensive plan of commercial opposition" to
England, against the wishes of the majority of the commercial delegates. Schlesinger,
The Colonial Merchants and The American Revolution, 1763-1776, in 78 COLtMBIA
UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAw 412-19 (1918). It
therefore "involved a defeat for the moderates and the mercantile interests." Id. at
432.
92 See, e.g., W. GEWEHR, THE GREAT AWAKENING IN VIRGINIA, 1740-1790, at
5, 8-9, chs. 2-6 (1930), detailing the 1734 revival meeting of Jonathan Edwards in
Massachusetts, Wesley and Whitefield in Georgia in 1736-1737, and the movement in
Virginia. For the New York and other awakenings see C. MAXSON, THE GREAT
AWAKENING IN THE MIDDLE COLONIES 69-116 (1920).
93 See also note 78 supra.
94J. SANDERS, supra note 59, at 329. See also J. BASSETT, THE HISTORIANS, in
1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 27-30 (W. Trent, J. Erskin,
S. Sherman, & C. Van Doren eds. 1933) (prose literature); COLONIAL PROSE AND
POETRY passim (W. Trent & B. Wells eds. 1901) (poetry); 1 A. HORNBLOW, A HIS-
TORY OF THE THEATRE IN AMERICA FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE PRESENT TIME
(1919) (theatre); S. ISHMAN, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN PAINTING passim (1927)
(painting). Newspapers, periodicals, and reprints of overseas volumes became fairly
common. 1 V. PARRINGTON, THE COLONIAL MIND 1620-1800: MAIN CURRENTS IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927), is, of course, indispensable for not only the preceding
but also because of its analysis of political and religious thoughts and philosophies.
Outdoor and indoor sports such as horse racing, running, shooting, cardplaying, and
dancing were indulged in. Adams, Provincial Society 1690-1763, in 3 A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LIFE (A. Schlesinger & D. Fox eds. 1927).
95 See, e.g., C. BECKER, THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 59, 66-67, 73 (1918).
Compare the laudatory description in C. VAN TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE ch. 18 (1922), with C. BECKER, supra at 59, 66-67, 73. The bias
found in history textbooks (happily now on the road out) denigrates English kings,
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albeit slightly altered by the non-English settlers and the new coun-
try to which all had to adapt,"6 and the religious convictions which
had compelled many to flee Old World persecutions." Neverthe-
less, when protests against the Mother Country were made in pre-
Revolutionary days it is interesting to note their kind and type,
and the "people" from whom they emanated."
For example, on October 7, 1765, a Stamp Act Congress met
in New York's City Hall, with 27 delegates from nine colonies par-
ticipating."o These delegates had been chosen by their State legis-
latures to protest the Stamp Act passed by Parliament in March of
that year. Although elected by a restricted group of the inhabi-
tants, the legislators additionally further restricted the representa-
tion to this Congress, and yet the latter's famous resolutions of Oc-
tober 19th concerning "taxation without representation" inveighed
against the Act on 'behalf of "a people" and "the people."'100 Even
more to the point, although little publicized by history, is another
illustration of the manner in which the generalized "people" was
improperly used although particularized interests were involved.
The 1676 "revolt" by Nathaniel Bacon against royal tyranny in
Virginia, a century before the Stamp Act Congress met, ostensibly
was a protest over the failure of the Royal Governor to protect the
frontiers against the warring Indians. Bacon proclaimed himself
"Generall, by the Consent of the People," issued "The Declaration
of the People" against the Governor, and put the latter to flight
before he was restored to authority. The "Declaration" inveighed
against the failure of the Governor to protect the colonists but con-
demned him because of "unjust Taxes;" for not having "In any
Measure advanced... Fortifications, Towns, or Trade;" for having
advanced to judicial positions "ignorant Favourites;" and for "as-
background, and so on, and is analyzed in detail in R. 3ILLiNGTON, THE HISTORIAN'S
CONTRiBUTiON TO ANGLO-AMERICAN MtIsUNDERSTANDING (1966).
96See, e.g., discussion by C. ANDREWS, COLONIAL FOLKWAYS paSssim (1919). On
the adoptation of the English common law to new American conditions, see Forkosch,
The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its Modern Application to Labor, 40 TEXAS
L. REV. 303, 473 n.1 (1962).
07 J. HATFIELD, FOUR LECruIIES 65 (1936), concludes from an examination of our
early Puritan background, that "Aristocracy naturally follows from the foregoing ...."
98 E.g., C. BEcKER, supra note 91, at 73-97; A. SCHLESiNGER, supra note 91, chs.
10-14.
09 Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, and New Hampshire were not represented
because the early call rendered it impossible to choose delegates.
o00 "II.L That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people .... IV. That
the people of these colonies .... V. That the only representatives of the people of
these colonies are persons chosen therein by themselves" and no taxes can be "constitu-
tionally imposed on them, but by their respective legislatures."
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suming the monopolie of the Bever Trade." Cast against the earlier
discussion of the composition of "the people," and of their rights
and privileges with respect to voting and holding office, trade and
commerce, and so on, this "Declaration" smacks of hypocrisy when
it speaks in the name of all.'
Another illustration involves the Declaration of Independence,
drafted by 33-year-old Thomas Jefferson, which as has already been
noted contains 10 uses of "people," most not relevant."0 2 But even
then the few which are pertinent are immediately cast into ambi-
guity when there is first considered the ringing self-evident truth,
"that all men are created equal," et cetera. To whom does "men"
here refer? And also in the next clause, "That to secure these
rights,' Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed"? In the context of
the Declaration's opening paragraphs, there is questionably' a ref-
'
0 1 See generally G. FISHER, THE COLONIAL ERA 53-55 (1901). Bacon "was
connected with the celebrated English family of that name, and on coming over to
Virginia, had been made one of the Council. He was a rich planter, courageous, and
eloquent in speech. [He saw his overseer and a favorite servant killed by the Indians.]
Being denied a military commission from Berkeley he put himself at the head of five
hundred volunteers . . . ." Id. A hundred years later (1768-1771) North Carolina
saw a similar and also ineffective uprising by the Regulators.
102 See notes 20-21 supra.
103 While the Declaration of Independence voiced a natural ("inalienable") rights
(and law) doctrine, and "that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happi-
ness,' in his 1774 Summary View of the Rights of British America, Jefferson also
felt "[tihat the exercise of a free trade with all parts of the world, possessed by the
American colonists, as of natural rights," could not be encroached upon. 1 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 432 (P. Ford ed. 1904).
104 Historically, the Greek cities were restricted as to citizenship, due to their hier-
archical structure, i.e., family-phratry-tribe-city, J. DE COULANGrES, THE ANCIENT
CITY 168 (Small, transl. 1959), and the few ruled the many, A. ZIMMERN, THE
GREEK COMMONWEALTH 140 (5th ed. 1931); even when Roman citizenship encom-
passed the known world the effective franchise was exercised primarily, if not only, by
the minority of those residing in Rome. H. WOLFF, ROMAN LAW 28 (1951). The
colonial politicians were familiar with all this, and also knew their English common
law, that is, the status of which Maine later wrote, H. MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON
EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM (1886); H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861); and the Nor-
man Conquest and feudalism; thus a distinction between the rulers and the ruled was
assumed to be part of the unfolding political structure centuries before this.
In this light The Federalist No. 57 may be read:
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich,
more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty
heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and
unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of
the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every
State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.
1d. at 378 (D. Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton).
This quotation discloses that "the great body of the people" is immediately restricted
by "the same wro exercise this right in every State," and on these latter the preceding
analysis discloses how few these were.
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erence to the totality of the population, but when his bill of par-
ticulars is fashioned the term "people" is definitely a restricted
one. °5 We know that Jefferson had 2 years earlier expressed the
views that "our ancestors... were the free inhabitants of the British
dominions in Europe," and that "the emigrants thought proper to
adopt that system of laws under which they had hitherto lived in
the mother country . "..  Therefore, he queried, "Can any one
reason be assigned why 160,000 electors in the island of Great
Britain should give law to four millions in the states of America,
every individual of whom is equal to every individual of them
.... ?"10' These figures immediately disclose that Jefferson's dia-
tribes were in the nature of special pleading throughout; for the
1790 census of the United States gives the total number of all its
inhabitants as just under 4 million,0 7 and the somewhat com-
parable 1801 figure for Great Britain is 10 million. 08 But, as we
have also seen, in both nations the electorate was an exceedingly
restricted one, and if Jefferson's 160,000 is not too farfetched then
the comparable one for the United States in 1774 was undoubtedly
about the same, if not less.' In any view of the matter, however,
"every individual" in the colonies of 1774 certainly did not factually
include the totality of "the people" although Jefferson's terminology
sought to create this impression.
That this conclusion is correct is disclosed by two facts: In his
Summary View of the Rights of British America, Jefferson referred
to the King's rejection of colonial laws "of the most salutary ten-
dency. The abolition of domestic slavery is the great object of de-
sire in those colonies, where it was unhappily introduced in their
infant state."" 0  His "Declaration" as originally drafted likewise
condemned the King who "prostituted his Negative for Suppressing
2051n having these "I[facts . . .submitted to a candid world," Jefferson also in-
cluded the Crown's obstruction to immigration and naturalization, albeit without limit-
ing this to the nonindentured, nonconvict, persons; he also condemned the slave trade
in his draft, but the Congress deleted this. See note 111 infra.
1061 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 103, at 429, 431, 436.
"Were this to be admitted," he concludes, "instead of being a free people... we should
suddenly be found the slaves not of one but of 160,000 tyrants....
10 7 See note 65 supra and authorities cited therein.
108P. GREGG, A SOCAL AND ECONOMtIC HISTORY OF BPnAIN 1760-1960, at 582
(5th ed. 1962).
109 A. MCKINLEY, supra note 72, at 487-90, gives probable voting percentages,
which are here arbitrarily weighted and also reduced in terms of population as of 1774.
The benefit of every doubt has been given to the colonies, although this is questionable,
and in view of the facts given earlier the conclusion of equality, in the text, is suspect.
110 1 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 103, at 440.
19681
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [VoL 19:644
every legislative Attempt" to prevent his importation of slaves, but
the first three paragraphs of this reference, combined into two
by the committee, were entirely omitted 'by the Continental Con-
gress.'11 These facts, in conjunction with the inclusion in the
United States Constitution of article I, section 9, clause l's prohibi-
tion against the importation of slaves after 1803,"' bear witness
not only to Jefferson's dislike of slavery and his never-ending strug-
gle against it, but also to the fact that prior to the adoption of the
Constitution "the people" was a much restricted term, even to him.
III. THE DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Articles of Confederation had not provided a workable
form of cooperative" 3 governments;" 4 there was little security in
property,"5 trade and commerce were rendered difficult,"' and the
111 Id. at 52-53. Jefferson felt that this passage was "struck out in compliance to
S. Carolina & Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves
& who on the contrary still wished to continue it. Our northern brethren also, I believe,
felt a little tender under these censures; for tho' their people have very few slaves them-
selves, yet they have been pretty considerable carriers of them to others." F. MONA-
GHAN, supra note 88, at 19.
112 Jefferson's account of the bargain between the Southern and Northern States,
i.e., to admit slaves for a period of years in exchange for eliminating the two-thirds re-
quirement for a legislative vote, is given in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
119 (H. Washington ed. 1854). For a general account by Jefferson see id. at 115-22.
113 "Whoever wishes to describe the political life of the American people ... must
appreciate the yearning of the American heart after self-direction." H. MOJNSTER-
BERG, THE AMERICANS 3 (1907).
114 See, e.g., references and analyses in 1 G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN,
FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 260 (1861); M. FORKOScH,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 1 §§ 5-6 (1956); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 4 n.1 (1928). See also letter of John Adams to Rufus King, June 14,
1786: "The most alarming Circumstance that has happened is the Inattention to Con-
gress." 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 182 (C. King ed. 1894).
For an extended discussion see 1 J. MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES ch. 2 (1883), and especially id. at 132-37, where the low esteem and
even contempt for Congress is disclosed to have infected the legislators as well.
115 The classic illustration is Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts during 1786-1787,
when he led a body of farmers against the courts and, apparently, intended also to com-
pel the legislature to adopt their program; they were dispersed by a privately-financed
militia. See note 117 infra. Concerning this incident General Henry Knox wrote to
Washington on October 23, 1786, "What is to afford us security against the violence
of lawless men? Our Government must be braced, changed or altered to secure our
lives and property." Quoted in C. WARREN, supra note 114, at 31. Knox also wrote:
"Their creed is 'That the property of the United States has been protected from the con-
fiscations of Britain by the joint exertions of all, and therefore ought to be the common
property of all.'" Quoted in 1 L. HACKER, supra note 68, at 235; see 1 G. CURTIS, supra
note 114, at 269. Curtis states, speaking of Massachusetts: "A levelling, licentious
spirit, a restless desire for change, and a disposition to throw down the barriers of pri-
vate rights, at length broke forth in doctrines and purposes were embraced by many
young, active, and desperate men in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire."
Id. at 273.
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conditions of the farmers17 and the very poor" 8 were not too good.
Madison summed up the Congressional attitude: "All agreed and
owned that the Federal Government in its existing shape was inef-
ficient and could not last,""' and Washington eventually agreed to
attend the Philadelphia Convention, despite "the disordered frame
of my body" (i.e., his rheumatism), because of "a conviction that
our [country'sl affairs are verging fast to ruin."'120  As Randolph
later put it, "[t~he imbecility of the Confederation was proved and
acknowledged."' 12' There existed strong sentiment for a division
into separate confederacies or republics,1 22 and the supporters of a
union were doubly alarmed -by Shays' Rebellion, for here was con-
centrated momentarily the leveling spirit of the colonial past, to-
gether with the current feeling of these few that what had been
saved by all belonged to all!' "The full significance of the
threat[s] was understood by men of large means,"'" but the im-
1 16See generally M. FoRKoscH, ANTITRuST AND THE CONSUMER ch. 3 (1956);
E. GREENE, THE F OuNDATIoNS OF AmEucAN NATIONALITY 419 (rev. ed. 1935).
117 See, e.g., L. HACKER, supra note 68, at 233, pointing to the
high prices for goods needed by farmers, while the prices they received fell
sharply as a result of agricultural overexpansion .... Notably in 1785-86,
agrarian distress was acute and farmers sought the customary reliefs. They
pressed legislatures for new fiat money issues and the passage of moratoriums,
or stay laws, to prevent land mortgage foreclosures.
See M. FORROScH, supra note 116, at 242-52 detailing the farmers' pressures in the
passage of the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act. On the anti-levelling device of the con-
tract clause mentioned in note 132 infra, see the ineffectual importunings of Justice
Sutherland in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (dis-
senting opinion), against the alleged factual reversal by the majority; cf. Black's state-
ment in Wood v. iovett, 313 U.S. 362, 383 (1941) (dissenting opinion), that the "de-
cision represented a realistic appreciation of the fact that ours is an evolving society and
that the general words of the contract clause were not intended to reduce the legislative
branch of government to helpless impotency."
118 See, e.g., description by 1 J. McMASTER, sapra note 114, at 96-102.
119 Diary of James Madison, February 21, 1787, quoted by C. WARREN, supra note
114, at 28. See also Letter from Madison to Washington, February 21, 1787, in 2
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 316 (Hunt ed. 1901): 'Those who remain attached to
the latter form [of Republic government] must soon perceive that it cannot be preserved
at all under any modification which does not redress the ills experienced from our pres-
ent establishments." See also note 114 supra.
12 0 Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox, April 27, 1787, in 29 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 209 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939). He also wrote
that he was thus departing from a resolution never to step outside the walks of private
life.
1213 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TON OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 188 (1901) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S
DEBATES).
1 22 See quotations and references in C. WARREN, supra note 114, at 28-30.
12 3 See J.T. ADAMS, supra note 89, at 219, recounting the fall in prices, the resulting
depression, and the country's mood. See also note 115 sapra.
124 1 L HAcxER, THE SHAPING OF THE AEmmcAN TRADITION, 235 (1947).
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mediate stimulus for an amending convention was the failure of
the 1786 Annapolis meeting of Commissioners from five States to
suggest "an uniform System in their commercial intercourse and
regulations,"' 6 although in their report to Congress they detailed
the Confederacy's weaknesses and urged that a convention be
held."2 6 Congress formally received a copy of the Commissioners'
Report and, on February 21, 1787, recommended to the States that
a meeting of their delegates be held at Philadelphia that coming
May "for the sole and express purpose 27 of revising the Articles of
125 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 2 (1894). See I ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 121, at 119 (taken
from Report of Commissioners to their respective States, and also sent to Congress);
M. FoRKoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (1956). Madison discussed the commer-
cial problem extensively in 1 J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
36-43 (Scott ed. 1898). One historian digests what Noah Webster and others then felt,
namely, that "[t] he great vice or evil under the Constitution, as it then existed, which
was generally admitted, was, that many of the laws of the Union applied only to the
States, in their corporate capacity, and did not act directly upon the people or the sub-
jects constitutionally embraced in them." A. STEPHENS, PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 293 (1882).
126 Prior requests for a revising convention had been ignored, e.g., New York's in
1782, and the later ones by Madison and the Massachusetts Legislature.
127 The credentials presented by the delegates to the subsequent Convention were,
of course, the State resolutions or statutes so authorizing them to act, and the particular
language in each such credential did not necessarily contain these limiting words. For
example, New Hampshire's and North Carolina's sole general reference to the Conven-
tion "proposed... for the purpose of revising the federal Constitution"; 1 U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, supra note 125 at 9, 35; Maryland's was for "the purpose of revising the
Fcederal System," id. at 25; Massachusetts quoted the Congressional language and au-
thorized its delegates to attend "for the purposes aforesaid," id. at 11; New York did
not so quote but used the exact language in the body of its resolution, id. at 14; New
Jersey authorized delegates "for the purpose of taking into Consideration the state of
the Union, as to trade and other important objects, and of devising such other Provi-
sions as shall appear to be necessary to render the Constitution . .. adequate to the
exigencies thereof." Id. at 16-17. Pennsylvania's legislature was "fully convinced of
the necessity of revising the federal Constitution for the purpose of making such Altera-
tions and amendments as the exigencies of our Public Affairs require," id. at 19, and it
authorized its delegates to "join with" other State delegates "in devising, deliberating
on, and discussing all such alterations and further Provision, as may be necessary to
render the Fcederal Constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union," id. at
20; Delaware's introductory language was, "revising the Federal Constitution, and add-
ing thereto such further Provisions, as may render the same more adequate to the Exigen-
cies of ... the Union," id. at 23, but its enacting clause granted the delegates power to
join with the other delegates in doing exactly what the Pennsylvania legislature had
authorized (except for deleting "all" and "fully," id. at 24). The Virginia statute, re-
ferred to by Pennsylvania's and Delaware's acts, was entitled "An Act for appointing
Deputies ... for the purpose of revising the federal Constitution," but its introductory
paragraph referred only to the Annapolis Convention and then used flowery language
of hope, and so on, before it authorized its delegates to meet with others "in devising"
et cetera in words identical with the preceding except for omitting "deliberating on"
and using "farther" instead of "further." Id. at 28. Georgia's statute, id. at 46, was
identical with that of Virginia's in this enacting respect, while South Carolina's lan-
guage was only slightly different, "in devising and discussing all such alterations,
Clauses, articles, and Provisions, as may be thought necessary to render the Federal Con-
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Confederation."' 28  The credentials of the delegates (except for
Rhode Island which did not participate) were all from, and authen-
ticated by, officials of the 12 State legislatures.' The "people,"
therefore, even if restricted to the minority of voters, thus never
acted in any direct manner initially or later to propose, or at any
time until the eventual ratifications, to approve such an amending
or other convention, nor even to elect or appoint these delegates;
indirectly, of course, one may argue that "their" representatives so
acted on their behalf and that even if jurisdictionally questionable
at the inception, the later ratifications removed any infirmities.
But even after the Convention's self-undertaken task of creating
a new form of government was completed, and it reported back to
Congress, that body's unanimous resolution that the new Constitu-
tion "be submitted to a Convention of delegates chosen in each
state, by the people thereof,"'80 is nevertheless subject to the same
preceding criticism, and this even though some of the ultimate
ratifications stated they were by deputies or delegates "of the peo-
ple" of the State."'l If Congress' requirement that the proposed
stiration entirely adequate to the actual Situation and future good Government of the
confederated States." Id. at 38. Connecticut's act was a combination of phrases, em-
powering its delegates to attend "for the purposes mentioned in the said Act of Congress
•.. and to discuss upon such Alterations and Provisions agreeable to the general Princi-
ples of Republican Government as they shall think proper to render the federal Con-
stitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union
.Id. at 13.
This miscellany of jurisdictional language ranged from the extremely narrow and
restricted to the unusually broad and (practically) unlimited, so that the raising of the
initial question of jurisdiction which the Convention had to resolve is understandable;
its resolution, however, favored the unlimited view.
128 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 125, at 8; 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
121, at 120. The Convention, of course, ignored this limitation and proposed a new form
of government and a new constitution. See M. FORKOSCH, supra note 125, at 6. Wash-
ington, in a letter to Knox of February 3, 1787, referred to the Massachusetts situation
and then spoke of the forthcoming Convention, stating, inter alia,
The legality of this Convention I do not mean to discuss, nor how problem-
atical the issue of it may be. That powers [in the current national govern-
ment] are wanting, none can deny. Through what medium they [the powers]
are to be derived, will, like other matters, engage public attention. That
which takes the shortest course to obtain them, will, in my opinion, under
present circumstances, be found best. 29 THE WRiTiNGS OF GEoRGE WASH-
INGTON, supra note 125, at 152.
Patrick Henry, during the Virginia debates on ratification, "had doubts of the power of
those who went to the Convention, but now we are possessed of it [the Constitution],
let us examine it... [We thought their deliberations would have been solely confined
to that revision. Instead of this, a new system, totally different in its nature... is pre-
sented...." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, at 144.
129 3 ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, at 126-39.
10 Id. at 319.
131 See, e.g., Delaware: "We, the deputies of the people ... " Pennsylvania: "we,
the delegates of the people .... I d. at 319. See also Connecticut, id. at 321, Massa-
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:644
Constitution be submitted for approval to conventions of delegates
"chosen in each state by the people thereof" was meant to include
all the people, then it may logically be urged that our Constitution
was never properly ratified as "the people" did not include all; but
this is ridiculous, as by "the people" the Convention delegates and
the Congressional members understood whom they meant, the State
legislatures and the populace likewise so understood the restricted
application of the term, and the ratifying delegates never urged
otherwise. For example, at the opening of the Virginia debates on
ratification Edmund Pendelton, its elected President, opposed a mo-
tion by Patrick Henry during a session of the Committee of the
Whole Convention, that the statute appointing delegates to the
earlier Annapolis meeting"3 2 be read, saying this ratifying body
should "not consider whether the federal Convention exceeded their
powers.... This Constitution was transmitted to Congress by that
Convention; by the Congress transmitted to our legislature; by them
recommended to the people; the people have sent us hither to de-
termine whether this government be a proper one or not."'33  In
effect, therefore, not only did a minority of the totality of the "peo-
ple" propose, formulate, and ratify the new Constitution, but even
this minority itself acted throughout by minority-authorized dele-
gates. 4 Professor Beard's view, early rejected by Professor War-
chusetts, id. at 322, Georgia, id. at 324, Maryland, id. at 324, South Carolina, id. at 325,
New Hampshire, id. at 326, Virginia, id. at 327, New York, id. at 327, and Rhode Is-
land, id. at 334. The ratifications of New Jersey and North Carolina are somewhat
interesting. The former's third introductory paragraph refers to the legislature's prior
resolution which "recommended to such of the inhabitants of this state as are entitled to
vote for representatives in General Assembly, to meet" and vote for delegates to a ratify-
ing convention, id. at 320; the latter's document merely resolves "That this Conven-
tion, in behalf of the freemen, citizens and inhabitants" so ratify. Id. at 333. (Ver-
mont, in 1791, notified "the inhabitants, who, by law, are entitled to vote for repre-
sentatives in General Assembly.... to meet" and vote for delegates, although the Con-
vention's ratification is barren of any pertinent reference. Id. at 337-38.) Of course
the mere fact that all ratifications other than these last two (three) gratuitously incor-
porated "people" as the base upon which their conventions acted did not broaden such
foundation beyond their own (implied) limitations which the last expressed. See also
notes 138, 143 infra, on aspects involved above.
132 See note 122 supra.
133 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, at 6. Henry thereupon withdrew his mo-
tion.
134 Professor Warren notes that the
delegates were appointed by State Legislatures; and in most of the States,
the small farmers, who formed a part of the debtor class at that time (if such
a thing as a distinctively debtor class existed - which is doubtful), had a fully
adequate respresentation in the Legislatures. This fact is frequently over-
looked by historians - the fact that, since possession of freehold in land
was then a property qualification for voting . . . , it was pecularly the small
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ten,3" that the Constitution "was not the product of an abstraction
known as 'the whole people,' but of a group of economic interests
which must have expected beneficial results from its adoption," is
also at odds with modern research 36 and the predominantly politi-
cal needs of the nation then and later on,' although the inclusion
in the ultimate Constitution of the clauses preventing States from
farmers who, in most States, were possessed of the requisite qualification to
vote. C. WARREN, supra note 114, at 70-71.
See also Virginia's ratifying Debates where one delegate supported article I, section 2,
clause 1 of the proposed Constitution as permitting each State to choose its national
representatives by those qualified to choose its local ones, for
Uniformity of qualifications would greatly affect the yeomanry in the states,
as it would either exclude from this inherent right some who are entitled to
it by the laws of some states at present, or be extended so universally as to
defeat the admirable end of the institution of representation. 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 121, at 8.
However, Brown, in his studies of the relationship between the politics and the sotial
structure conducted in two States, concluded that the predominance of the upper classes,
and their influence in politics did not depend upon this restricted franchise but that
support had to come from men of all classes in order to gain office. IL BROWN,
MIDDLE-CLASS DEMOCRACY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MASSACHUSETES, 1691-1780(1955); R. BROWN, VIRGINIA, 1705-1786: DEMOcRACY OR ARISTOCRACY? (1964).
On the paradox of exclusion from the polls and yet consent to the concepts of govern-
ment, see Pole, Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy, 67 AM.
HISTORY REV. 626 (1962), and for a possible answer, in terms of what Bagehot called
"a deferential society," see Buel, Democracy and the American Revolt: A Frame of
Reference, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 165 (3d ser. 1964).
135 C. BEARD, AN ECONOM[C INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 17 (1913).
For Beard's immediate precursors see J. SMITH, SPIRIT OF AmERICAN GOVERNmENT,
A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1907), and A. SimONs, SOCIAL FORCES IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (1912). Warren also cites, in support of Beard's thesis, H. BARNES,
HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE (1926). Cf. however, Washington's views in a
letter from George Washington to Henry Knox, Aug. 19, 1787 (during the Conven-
tion) of the "diversity of ideas as prevail"; letter from George Washington to Patrick
Henry, Sept 24, 1787, of the "attempts ... made to reconclle such variety of interests
and local prejudices as pervade the several States"; letter from George Washington
to Henry Knox, Oct. 15, 1787, (concerning the opposition to ratification) which will
"be governed by sinister and self important motives." The above letters may be found
in 29 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WAS-INGTON, supra note 120, at 261, 278, 289.
See also Paul Ford's comment on the slave trade clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1,
prohibiting their importation after 1808, that the compromise had'a background which
disclosed that in 1784 Virginia voted against the exclusion of slavery from the Western
Territory by "voting for what seemed their best interests, regardless of moral considera-
tions." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 274 n. (P. Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton).
136 See, e.g., B. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956); F.
MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE (1958); Holcombe, Sections, Classes, and the Federal
Constitution, in THE GASPER G. BACON LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 30 (1953), who concludes that the Constitution "was the supreme in-
stance in history up to 1787 of the triumph of the average man." For additional com-
ments and criticisms, see J. MAIN, TME ANTtFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CON-
STITUTION 1781-1788 (1961), and for an excellent commentary on the reactionary fear
of these men, and their obsession with the spectre of power wielded by others than
themselves, see Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of
Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (3d set. 1955).
137 See, e.g., this writer's analysis of the amendments in note 15 supra.
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issuing legal tender paper and denying them the right to impair the
obligations of contracts was undoubtedly a conservative reaction
against the leveling tendencies of the farmers (and others)."' Ad-
ditionally, too little credit is given to contemporary views of the
characters of the delegates and their motives,"3 9 although one must
be somewhat careful in translating their expressed concern for the
"poor man" and the "people."' 40  For example, during the Virginia
138See, e.g., notes 115, 117 supra, and Madison's introduction to his Journal of
the Federal Convention: "In the internal administration of the States, a violation of
contracts had become familiar, in the form of depreciated paper made a legal tender, of
property substituted for money, of instalment laws, and of the occlusions of the courts
of justice .... 1 J. MADISON, supra note 125, at 47. On the "leveling democracy"
then in progress, which included the extension of the suffrage, see J. JAMESON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT (1926). Jameson
points to the abolition of feudal indicia such as primogeniture and entail, the disestab-
lishment of the Anglican church, the abolition of slavery, et cetera. Hacker writes:
There is no question that the Convention was a class assembly . . . .Yet
to regard [it as] ... called for the exclusive purpose of protecting propertied
interests is a mistake. ... From the labors of the Convention emerged that
national union that seemed the only effective reply to the uncertainties of the
hour. The safeguarding of property against leveling assault was assured by
two devices.... By positive measures the strength of the national government
was equally provided for ... It is possible to argue that the alarums and ex-
cursions of the period ... account for many of the anti-leveling devices writ-
ten into the document. L. HACKER, supra note 124, at 237.
See also Jensen's analyses for the period 1774-1781, THE ARTICLES, supra note 22,
and for the confederation period 1781-1789, THE NEW NATION, supra note 22, point-
ing to the "conservative counter-revolution" of 1787 whereby now, in the Constitu-
tion, these conservatives were able to erect a "nationalistic government whose purpose
in part was to thwart the will of 'the people' in whose name they acted." THE ARTI-
CLES, supra note 22, at 245. Jensen's two lists of nine leading Federalists and anti-
Federalists, and his discussions concerning them and their efforts, is intriguing and
here apropos.
139 For example, it was felt that the Convention of 1787 "contained a larger pro-
portion of members possessing high character, intellectual ability, political sagacity, and
farsighted statesmanship" than others preceding it. Jefferson, for example, gave his
"high opinion of the abilities and honesty" of the delegates, Franklin wrote they were
"men of character," and even the document's opponents conceded the delegates "purest
intentions and respectability, and that they included "the best, and the most enlightened
of our citizens." Quoted in C. WARREN, supra note 114, at 67-68. But see the views
of "Rusticus," id. at 691. Madison wrote, though in his declining years, "that there
never was an assembly of men .. .who were more pure in their motives or more ex-
clusively or anxiously devoted to ... best secure the permanent liberty and happiness
of their country." Id. at 68. Warren lists the future careers of some of the 55 men,
e.g., eight as representatives to the First Congress and 10 as Senators, two became Presi-
dents, and one a Vice President, two Chief Justices and three Associate Justices, one an
Attorney-General and then Secretary of State, one Secretary of Treasury, six governors,
and four ministers to foreign countries. He concludes "these men [therefore] possessed
the confidence of the people of the country .... " Id. at 69. Again we may repeat here
the minority status of these "people."
140 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, at 293-305 (Pendleton, on
June 12, 1788, during the Virginia Convention debates on ratification); id. at 137, 151,
164-65, 188 (numerous references to the generality of "people" by Henry and Ran-
dolph). Patrick Henry expressed his espousal of "[t]he middle and lower ranks of
people [who] have not those illuminated ideas which the well-born are so happily pos-
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debates on ratification Patrick Henry was compelled to apologize
to Edmund Randolph because of his charges against the latter's
consistency," but shortly became himself the butt for an alleged
error; this rejoinder, however, disclosed that the "people" who, as
Washington 'believed, would always have the "power under the
Constitution,"'42 here were to consist of "the industrious farmer
and planter" who were the "honest citizens" whom the government
was to protect in "person and property," whether or not at the mo-
ment temporarily a "poor man." ' Even Madison, in a letter to
Jefferson, divided "the people" in Virginia into "three parties,"
namely, those who desired to adopt the proposed Constitution with-
out amendments, to adopt "a few additional guards in favor of the
sessed of .... Id. at 140. See also his attack upon Randolph for the use of "herd"
in referring to the people. Id. at 148; see id. at 293. John Marshall supported the
proposed dual structure: "Are they not both the servants of the people? Are not Con-
gress and the state legislatures the agents of the people... ?" Id. at 233. Pendleton
alleged that "[t]he happiness of the people is the object of this government, and the
people are therefore made the fountain of all power. They cannot act personally, and
must delegate powers." Id. at 297. See also Luther Martin's "Genuine Information"
to the Maryland ratifying Convention concerning the proceedings, and referring to "the
state governments which are to watch over and protect the rights of the individual,
whether rich or poor, or of moderate circumstances." 4 id. at 359.
1413 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, at 188.
142 Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington, Nov. 10, 1787, in 29
T E WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 120, at 311. That Washington
used this term ambiguously may be shown by reference to the only time he ever spoke
"on the record" (at the 1787 Convention). Madison's Notes give the substance. The
proposed Constitution then, in article I, section 2, clause 3, stated: "The number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every forty Thousand." This language, ac-
cording to Gorham, "had produced ... much discussion." He therefore moved to re-
duce this to 30,000, which was seconded. Washington then spoke on its favor, stating
"many members" felt the higher figure "an insufficient security for the rights and in-
terests of the people." See 2 FARRAND RECOIRS, supra note 81, at 644. Warren
gives a contemporary newspaper account, which has Washington saying that the re-
duction "would better suit my ideas, and, I believe, it will be more grateful to the wishes
of the people .... " C. WARREN, supra note 114, at 713. The delegates naturally
consented to the new figures, and Farrand notes that at "thirty" there is "faln erasure
in the [original] manuscript" 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 652 n.2.
14 3 Pendleton's remarks concerning Henry are apropos:
He professes himself an advocate for the middling and lower classes of men.
I profess to be a friend to the equal liberty of all men, from the palace to the
cottage, without any other distinction but that between good and bad men.
... Why bring into the debate ... the distinction of -wel-born from others?
... I am an advocate for ... giving to the poor man free liberty in his person
and property... I wish, sir, for a regular government, in order to secure and
protect those honest citizens who have been distinguished - I mean the in-
dustrious farmer and planter. I wish them to be protected in the enjoyment
of their honestly and industriously acquired property. I wish commerce to
be fully protected and encouraged, that the people may have an opportunity
of disposing of their crops at market. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 121,
at 295.
On "middling," see id. at 54.
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Rights of the States and of the people," and "those of a third class,
at the head of which is Mr. Henry," who concur with the second
but do so in order to "strike at the essence of the System," i.e., to
obtain rejection. Madison then wrote that while the State's judi-
ciary, bar, and others opposed the document, and elsewhere in the
southern part of the country
the men of intelligence, patriotism, property, and independent
circumstances are thus [also so] divided, all of this description,
with a few exceptions, in the Eastern States, & most of the Middle
States, are zealously attached to the proposed Constitution ....
It is not less worthy of remark that in Virginia where the mass of
the people have been so much accustomed to be guided by their
rulers on all new and intricate questions, they should on the pres-
ent which certainly surpasses the judgment of the greater part of
them, not only go before, but contrary to their most popular lead-
ers .... I will barely observe that the case in Virga. seems to prove
that the body of sober & steady people, even of the lower order,
are tired of the vicissitudes, injustice, and follies, which have so
much characterized public measures, and are impatient for some
change which promises stability and repose. 4 4
The clause, "even of the lower order," must have had a refer-
ent quite well understood by Jefferson, for no other description is
given. Patrick Henry's arguments and adoption included the latent
dangers of the new system which "are out of the sight of the com-
mon people .... I dread the operation of it on the middling' 45 and
lower classes of people: it is for them I fear the adoption of this
system."' 46  Translated, the Madison-Jefferson-Henry language and
understanding necessitates that "the lower order" or "lower classes"
be differentiated from the "body of sober & steady" or "middling"
(i.e., middle class) people; and these two groups or classes are now
to be differentiated from those on a higher plane, for example, the
aristocrats, professionals, and leaders. The upper and lower groups
need little further description; 47 the "middling" or middle class
group included the farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, and those who
were free, white, and otherwise eligible to, and did participate eco-
nomically and politically (religiously?) in the affairs of the com-
munity. In other words, the lower order or classes were "people"
generally, but not particularly, and even some of the middle group
could well be so classed. Even Madison's famous essay in The Fed-
144 5 WRIrrNGs oF JAMES MADISON, supra note 119, at 66-67.
145 See note 143 supra.
146 3 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, at 54; see note 143 supra.
147 See, e.g., analyses given above with respect to background in text accompanying
notes 43-112 supra.
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eralist No. 10 setting forth his views on economic interests and
factions, classes, and other groups exerting pressures upon govern-
ments, defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amount-
ing to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common... interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the . ..aggregate interests of the community."'" 8
Why "citizens," "whole," and "community" were here used and
throughout the essay, as well as "men" and "society," but nowhere
"people" save once, and that in a particular sense, 49 must have some
meaning; and the only reason can be that Madison, as did the
others, differentiated amongst the totality of the peoples in respect
to "unequal faculties" and "unequal distribution of property,"' 50
as well as inequalities in voting and other respects.' 51
But an even more interesting question may be raised when Mad-
ison's other pertinent language is considered, that is, his reference
to Virginia "where the mass of the people have been so much
accustomed to be guided by their rulers on all new and intricate
questions . . . ." Madison's views concerning the power of the
people eventually to exercise a degree of political control are given
in The Federalist Nos. 39, 46, 48, and 49, and these essays do not
disclose any limitations upon the totality, for example, "a govern-
ment which derives all its powers... from the great -body of the
people," the "federal and State governments are in fact but different
agents and trustees of the people," "the ultimate authority ... re-
sides in the people alone," "the people are the only legitimate foun-
tain of power," "appeals to the people," the legislators "dwell
among the people at large," "assemblies elected by the people."
However, it is suggested that Madison and all of the other politi-
148 THE FEDERALIsT No. 10, at 56 (P. Ford ed. 1898) (Madison).
149 In discussing the "two great points of difference between a democracy and a
republic" Madison first mentioned the representative form of government, under which
"it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the
people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves [as in a democracy], convened for the purpose." Id. at 60.
IOId, at 57.
151 Even Hamilton's use of broad language did not necessarily signify broad cover-
age, e.g., "a people spread over an extensive region," THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 420
(P. Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton). His references to ancient Greece included: "the peo-
ple at large," "elected by the people," and "elected by the whole body of the people,"
id. at 422, but even Hamilton would be the first to concede that these "people" did not
include the conquered and the slaves, i.e., the great mass of nonpeople. Madison, too,
used such generalities, e.g., "In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the peo-
ple is submitted to the administration of a single government .. " Id. NO. 51, at 346
(Madison). And in No. 53 Hamilton speaks of a "want" of "due responsibility in the
government to the people," and then shortly refers "to the representatives of the people."
See id. No. 84 (Hamilton).
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cians and "people" in that period made a careful distinction between
"a" people and "the" people, that is, the former would refer to the
totality and the latter to a lesser portion. For example, the "as-
semblies elected by the people" cannot equate with "dwell among
the people at large," for we have already seen how the electorate
was limited, and why did Madison insert "at large"?152  Similarly,
"the people [who] are the only legitimate fountain of [political]
power" must exclude the nonvoters, although "appeals to the peo-
ple" may be utilized generally and particularly, e.g., Washington's
appeals to the people to support his army by providing replace-
ments, food, and so on, as contrasted to Madison's present statement
that "[t~he executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar
favorite of the people." Even the first above quotation on "the
mass of the people ... guided by their rulers" may be likewise so
understood generally or particularly, although in context it is the
latter which must be accepted.' 53
The Convention delegates, therefore, met in a social, political,
and economic climate which did not disregard the immediate"
152 In No. 45 Madison says:
We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World that the people
were made for kings, not kings for the people, Is the same doctrine to be
revived in the New, in another shape - that the solid happiness of the peo-
ple is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different
form? Id. No. 45, at 304.
To an extent Madison is confusing two aspects of the term, for in the Old World
reference there never could be to voters under such a doctrine of absoluteness and "the
people" therefore had to include all save the king; in the new United States, however,
"the solid happiness of the people" could refer to all the people who were subject to
laws and institutions created by a minority of the people who deputized an even smaller
group so to act, or it could refer only to such minority. See Hamilton's ambivalent use
in id. No. 62, at 416.
153 See, e.g., Jay's use in No. 3, that the first object "to which a wise and free people
direct their attention" is safety, i.e., from abroad and at home. Id. No. 3, at 13.
Here the limited voters and upper groups are considered, but in No. 4 Jay refers to "the
safety of the people of America against dangers from" abroad, and the distributive aspect
of the term seems to be indicated, although a few paragraphs later he says "Et]he people
of America are aware" of these dangers and "[w]isely, therefore, do they consider union
... as necessary," which can refer only to the limited aspect of the term. Id. No. 4, at 18.
So, too, with Hamilton's use of "people," e.g., that "in republics strength is always
on the side of the people," which seems to indicate the generality, although two sen-
tences later he remarks that "[elverything beyond this must be left to .. . the people;
who... will hold the [voting] scales in their own hands ...." which discloses the lim-
ited persons so included. Id. No. 31, at 196-97.
On the use of "rulers" by Madison, compare his Convention language: 'The re-
spectability of this convention will give weight to their recommendation of" a plan
"for the attainment of a proper government." 1 FAIRAND RECORDS, supra note 81,
at 215.
154 The ancient past was a part of the thinking and vocabulary of practically every
public official or aspirant; even The Federalist, written for newspaper readers, men-
tioned Greece and other nations throughout, e.g., Hamilton's referring to Pericles, the
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past but built'55 upon it. 56 They not only knew but lived the con-
ditions for which they planned, and they daily saw the nature and
type of population, i.e., "the people," in their work and travels.
The generality or "mass" of the people were not, to them, to be
confused with the particularity of, for example, the electorate, the
landed gentry, or the other groups with whom they came in con-
tact. And when they used "people" in their debates, letters, and
discussions they knew, without qualifying language, to whom they
referred. For example, one of the objections to the Articles of Con-
federation was that it acted only through and upon the States which
could and did with impunity disregard Congressional calls, requests,
and aid;... but, as already quoted, the Congressional call was for
the purpose solely of revising the Articles, so that an initial question
of jurisdiction 'to do otherwise occupied the attention of the dele-
gates. " ' The Virginia (Randolph) Plan proposed a new tripartite
city of Samians and Phidias in THi FEDERALIST No. 6, at 28 (P. Ford ed. 1898).
155 . NYE, THIS ALMOST CHOsEN PEOPLE 45-46 (1966), writes that the United
States was the result of a willed,
creative act, by an identifiable set of people who deliberately set out to make
a nation. The Founding Fathers ... constructed the political machinery of
a nation... without any of the traditional, cultural, psychological, economic,
and social foundations to support it which in Europe took centuries to build.
This last sentence is too broad a statement and does not do justice to at least the English
heritage.
15OVery importantly, they actually lived under constitutions (and the Articles of
Confederation) but, as a comparison of the eventual Federal Constitution with some of
the State ones discloses, the language is identical in many instances. See, e.g., C. WAR-
REN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 31-38 (1928) (giv-
ing references to earlier works by others). Of interest here is the Massachusetts Pream-
ble which opens "We ... the people of... do ... ordain and establish .... "
Analogically, just as the shooting revolution of 1776 had earlier been accomplished
ideologically in the previous 15 years, so, too, the Constitution of 1789 had taken form
and content in the years preceding it. See, e.g., B. BAzLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
1 57 E.g., Mason, the first week the Convention worked,
observed that the present confederation was not only deficient in not pro-
viding for coercion and punishment agst. delinquent States; but argued very
cogently that punishment could not in the nature of things be executed on
the States collectively, and therefore that such a Govt. was necessary as could
directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt re-
quired it. 1 FARRAND REcoms, supra note 81, at 34.
(Madison's Notes are generally used); see id. at 133, 141, 406, 437, 447; 2 id. at 6-11
(additional reports of the disagreements among the members). The bone involved
was therefore the method of choosing the national legislature, i.e., if acting only upon
the States then these would choose, but if acting upon the people then these would elect.
Pierce therefore suggested "an election by the people as to the 1st. branch & by the States
as to the 2d. branch; by which means the Citizens of the States wd. be represented both
individually & collectively." Id. at 137 (italics omitted).
158 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787;
Letter from James Madison to George Washington, April 16, 1787 in id. at 338, 345
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form of government, with one branch of the national legislature
elected directly by the people and the other branch indirectly;'59
the later New Jersey (Patterson) Plan proposed that the existing
Articles "be so revised, corrected & enlarged, as to render the fed-
eral Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government ... .""
The Convention debated both plans, with, the jurisdictional question
being urged, whereupon James Wilson (Pennsylvania) remarked:
With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived
himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to
propose any thing. In this particular he felt himself perfectly in-
different to the two plans.
With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it
difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particu-
lar circle in which one moved, were commonly mistaken for the
general voice. He could not persuade himself that the State Govts.
& sovereignties were so much the idols of the people, nor a Nad.
Govt. so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why sd. a Natl.
Govt. be unpopular? Has it less dignity? Will each Citizen en-
joy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Dela-
ware be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the United States?
Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of
which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their
Govt.? No. Sir, It is from the Natl. Councils that relief is ex-
pected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would
not follow us into a national Govt. and it will be a further recom-
mendation of Mr. R.'s plan that it is to be submitted to them and
not to the Legislatures for ratification.161
(Madison's pre-Convention views). But see note 127 supra (analysis of the States' re-
sponses to the call).
159 1 FARRAIN RECORDs, supra note 81, at 20.
160 Id. at 242.
161 Id. at 253 (italics omitted). See also 3 id. at 138-43, giving Wilson's arguments
in the Pennsylvania Convention on ratification, arid mentioning "another reason ...
[which] increased the difficulties of the Federal Convention - the different tempers
and dispositions of the people for whom they acted," i.e., their electorate. Later he
speaks of "[t]he general sentiment in that body [the Convention), and, I believe, the
general sentiment of the citizens of America," i.e., not of "the people of America" but
of a special group, while in the same (and next) sentence he "presumes that Providence
has designed us for an united people, under one great political compact... supported
by the wishes of the people," i.e., a united general people supported by the wishes of a
particular people. For Madison's ("compact") views, favoring the new form of gov-
ernment, see 1 id. at 314-22.
Nine days after so speaking Wilson spoke again, referring to "the immense popula-
tion which is to fill" the new country, the influence which the new government would
have "not only on the present generation of our people & their multiplied posterity,
but on the whole Globe," and he explained why he opposed election of the national
legislature by the local ones because of
the twofold relation in which the people would stand. 1. as Citizens of the
Gen'l Govt't. 2. as Citizens of their particular State .... Both Govts. were
derived from the people - both meant for the people - both therefore
ought to be regulated on the same principles .... The Genl. Govt. is not an
assemblage of States, but of individuals for certain political purposes - it is
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The importance of this initial Convention problem,0 2 for our
purposes, cannot be minimized. As later disclosed, its resolution in
the Preamble may (or 'may not) be termed a "conspiracy," with
Gouverneur Morris seen as the chief conspirator, but for the mo-
ment this conclusion is not suggested.'63 Nevertheless, it is not in-
correct to call such a resolution a minor, if not a great, compro-
mise.'
Other delegates also used the term "people" somewhat loose-
ly,'6  while the contrary might be said as to various situations; and
the controversies surrounding the method of obtaining a Chief Ex-
ecutive, and that concerning the apportionment of representatives
and taxes, are good illustrations pro and con, as is the ultimate
adoption of section 2 of article IV. As to the President, the ques-
tion at issue was whether to have him "chosen 'by the National
Legish," to which Gouverneur Morris (Pennsylvania) was opposed;
he urged that that official "ought to be elected by the people at
not meant for the States, but for the individuals composing them: the indi-
viduals therefore not the States, ought to be represented in it .... Id. at 405-
06 (italics omitted).
16 2 See generally note 127 supra.
163 Cf. M. FoRKoscH, supra note 114, at 342-43 & n.50 (similar problem regarding
the adoption of the 14th amendment). But see C. WARREN, supra note 114, at 394-96
(discussed in text accompanying notes 210-14 infra).
164 During the debates in the first House of Representatives on amendments pro-
posed by Madison, Gerry of Massachusetts referred indirectly to this early problem
and said the 1787 Convention
was not convened in consequence of any express will of the people, but an
implied one, through their members in the State Legislatures. The Consti-
tution derived no authority from the first convention; it was concurred in
by conventions of the people, and that concurrence armed it with power and
invested it with dignity. 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 716 (1834) [1789-1791]
[hereinafter cited as ANNALS].
165 E.g., Roger Sherman of Connecticut felt the States under the Articles could be
forgiven for not complying with a request for taxes for "[t]hey were afraid of bearing
too hard on the people," i.e., all who paid taxes, and he later objected to the proposed
second house "to be chosen by the people," i.e., the electorate. "The people would not
much interest themselves in the elections .... 1 FARRAND RECORDS, sOpra note 81,
at 341, 342. George Mason of Virginia, speaking for the limiting of the President to
one 7-year term and to be chosen by the national legislature, mentioned proposals that
his "election should be made by the people at large," or "by Electors chosen by the
people for that purpose," and spoke of another plan "requiring each freeholder to vote
for several candidates." He felt that "the preservation of the rights of the people" re-
quired the President to "return to that mass [of people]." 2 id. at 119-20. Benjamin
Franklin felt such a return "to the mass of the people" was not degrading but promot-
ing, as "the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & sovereigns." Id.
at 120. See also the views of Luther Martin of Maryland, 3 id. at 153, 159 (before the
House of Representatives in explaining the debates), id. at 192, 229-30 (his "Genuine
Information" to the ratifying convention), id. at 284, (a reply to a critic). See also
the statements of Wilson, in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, quoted in C. VAN
DOREN, THE GREAT REmARSAL 183-84 (1948).
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large," and if that were all, one might suppose this was a total pop-
ulation view. However, Morris immediately stated that it was "by
the people at large, by the freeholders of the Country."'66  In the
ensuing debate Sherman (Connecticut) also used the phrase "people
at large," as did Mason (Virginia), while Wilson (Pennsylvania),
Morris in another remark, and Williamson (North Carolina) all
referred to "people" but without otherwise qualifying the term, i.e.,
in effect they understood both terms to mean the same.'67 Even
the question put to the Convention for a vote, which resulted in its
rejection, was "an election by the people instead of the Legisla-
ture ....... 168 As to the apportionment problem, that relating to
representation and taxation,'69 the Committee of Detail reported, on
August 6th, a proposed clause as follows:
The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated by the
whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of
every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude
for a term of years, and three fifths170 of all other persons not
comprehended in the foregoing description, (except Indians not
paying taxes) .... 171
Here is apparently unquestionable proof that the delegates knew
what "people" they were talking about, and that it and "persons"
had to be qualified at all times (save when politicking was engaged
in). The eventual language placed in the Constitution apportioned
representatives and direct taxes17' among the States "according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to
the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Ser-
vice173 for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
1662 FARRAmN RECORDS, supra note 81, at 29.
167 Id. at 29-31.
168 Id. at 32.
169 See note 216 infra.
170 On June 30th, during a discussion involving the big-little representation and
which eventually resulted in the Great Compromise (see note 182 infra), Madison sug-
gested an "expedient" which had "occurred" to him, namely,
that instead of proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to
their respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of
5 to 3. that they should be represented in one branch according to the num-
ber of free inhabitants only; and in the other according to the whole no.
counting the slaves as <if> free.
1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 486. Farrand, for July 11th, notes: "This be-
gins the debate on the 'three-fifths rule' which was finally adopted on July 13. The
question had previously been broached on June 11 and July 9." Id. at 580 n.5.
171Id. at 183.
172 See note 209 infra, on this term.
173The Committee of Style drafted this exact language save that "servitude" in-
stead of "Service" was used by it. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 590. See
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fifths of all other Persons." In other words, the Committee spoke
of "white and other free citizens," which could refer only to eman-
cipated nonwhites, and also included within "inhabitants" the to-
tality of the population (save as excepted). The delegates also here
used "persons" in a total sense, for they were now classifying this
totality into Indians not paying taxes and those who were, whites
who were free (citizens or inhabitants), whites bound to servitude,
nonwhites who were free (citizens or inhabitants), and all others
regardless of age, sex, or condition. The constitutional term "free
Persons" was thus understood ordinarily to exclude those bound to
servitude, so that these latter had to be expressly included by spe-
cific language; now also could "Persons" in its generality, i.e., "the
whole Number" or entirety of inhabitants, be used to replace the
specifics of "inhabitants of every age, sex and condition," for here
the term was not to be used for those who entered into a compact,
or who owned or transferred property, or who voted or held office,
but, rather, for wealth and the totality of 1population. 4  And when
"three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the -foregoing
description" is reduced by deleting the last six quoted words, the
reason is that "the foregoing description" was superfluous."'
also C. ANDREWS, COLONIAL FOLKWAYS 182 (1919), that indentured service "con-
tinued for many years even after the Revolution."
174 See, e.g., Gouverneur Morris' extended remarks in support of his motion to in-
sert "free" before "inhabitants" in a provision reported by the Committee of Detail
and eventually, as combined with others, now found in article I, section 2, clause 3 of
the Constitution. Inter alia, Morris was opposed to slavery as "a nefarious institution,"
and asked "fuJpon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in the repre-
sentation? Are they men? Then make them Citizens & let them vote? Are they
property? Why then is no other property included?" Morris' motion was defeated,
10-1. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 221-23. For analogous comments by
others see id. at 541, 562, 586 (King); iU. at 542, 580, 592, 593, 596 (Pinckney); id.
at 559, 580, 587 (Gorham); id. at 561 (Patterson); id. at 581 (Mason); id. at 581 (Wil-
liamson); id. at 581-83, 602, 604 (Morris); id. at 585 (Madison); id. at 586 (Sherman);
id. at 587 (Wilson); id. at 593 (Davie); id. (Johnson); id, at 594, 603 (Randolph).
In The Federalist No. 54, Hamilton discussed the method of apportionment and
distinguished between counting slaves for taxation and for representation, saying, inter
alia: "But we must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property, and in
no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is that they partake of both
these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other
respects as property ...... TEi FEDERAuST No. 54, at 361 (P. Ford ed. 1898) (Ham-
ilton).
175 Gerry of Massachusetts refused to sign the eventual document and, among his
objections, said that such proportion of Negroes "are to be represented as if they were
freemen;' i.e., the preceding description was applicable (solely) to the then slaves.
2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 633. Massachusetts, of course, had no slaves in
any quantity and so was being discriminated against as the Southern whites now would
cast more votes than those based solely upon themselves, as in the Northern States. See
Morris' remarks, supra note 174, and also the vigorous debate involving these principles,
although on another proposed section, in 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 219-23.
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The final illustration as to the use of language by the delegates,
but disclosing designed differentiations, concerns section 2 of article
IV. This section originally contained three clauses, the third of
which has been superseded by the 13th amendment. The first
clause entitles "The Citizens of each State" to the privileges and
immunities of "Citizens in the several States"; the second involves
extradition and (hopefully) requires that "A Person charged" crim-
inally in one State be delivered up by another; and the third stated
that "No person held to Service or Labour in one State" who es-
capes into another can now be discharged therefrom "but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom ... due." In these
clauses the references are to "Citizens," "Person," and "person," as
well as "Party." The first and last such terms are obviously differ-
ent from the other two and also from each other, but, it is suggested,
the two like words are not the same terms. In the third clause the
reference is unquestionably to slaves (and indentured servants), and
this was acted upon and enforced; 77 but in the second clause any
person, regardless of color or status, could be a fugitive from jus-
tice, e.g., a slave might kill a master.' Regardless of its reversal
by the Civil War and the 13th amendment, Taney's lengthy opinion
in Scott v. Sandford is generally not incorrect historically and legally,
and his analogous references to the Articles of Confederation are
apt,"' while his analysis of prior and contemporary clauses, statutes,
and decisions supports the present discussion for the purposes here
undertaken.
The observation may parenthetically be made that at this period
in the history of America a leveling spirit had begun to permeate
It may be remarked that Washington spoke once in the Convention, and then on the
question of representatives, with the delegates immediately following his lead. Note
142 supra. In The Federalist there was, of course, a spirited general defense. THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 52-55 (Hamilton).
176 Article IV, section 2 was held to impose only a moral duty to surrender up the
fugitive. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). Congress has some-
what circumvented this by a 1934 statute making it a federal offense, in a limited number
of cases, to flee interstate to avoid prosecution. Fugitives from Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1073 (1964).
177 1 Stat. 302 (1793). See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859);
Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229 (1847); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 536 (1842).
178 See, e.g., Hamilton's bifurcation, supra note 174. See also note 231 infra.
179 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (quoting from the privileges
and immunities clause in the former Articles of Confederation which referred to "the free
inhabitants of each of the States," and then from its article IX, section 5, which gave
the former Congress power to raise land forces, et cetera "in proportion to the number
of white inhabitants." See Warren's lengthy analysis of this case in 2 C. WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY ch. 26 (rev. ed. 1947).
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the subconsciousness of the country, but that it had not quite broken
through the conservatism of the Convention delegates. It was but
a century and a half before that the Long Parliament had defied the
King, Cromwell had fashioned his army and become the Protector
of the many, and the English Levelers and republicans had earlier
decried the yoke and bondage of Magna Carta and the common law
and desired to fashion a new and "written constitution which would
then become fundamental law for the land."' 80  The mounting
reaction against slavery 1. was but one illustration of a changed
and changing view of "people,"'" u presaging not only the abolition-
ism of the Civil War but also the populism of the Jackson Era of
the 1820's, the Granger Movement of the 1870's and the Bryan-
Wilson-LaFollette period in this century. 3 The Founding Fa-
thers"'84 reflected all this in their debates, especially with respect to
the Preamble and its introduced and changed versions. It is to
these that we now turn.
180 J. EUSDEN, PURITANS, LAWYERS, AND POLITICS IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 47 (1958). See also E. BERNSTEIN, CROMWELL AND COMMU-
NISM (Stenning transl. 1930); H. BRAILSFORD, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION (1961); T. PEASE, THE LEVELLER MOVEMENT (1916).
181 See, e.g., notes 77, 175 supra.
182 The Great Compromise in the Convention was based upon the method of rep-
resentation, i.e., if upon population only, then the small States feared the avalanche of
people from such States as Pennsylvania and New York would engulf them. See, e.g.,
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Compromise, of course, resulted in Senate
equality and House representation on population. During the debates Wilson (Penn-
sylvania) exclaimed, "Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is
it for mes, or for the imaginary beings called States? Will our honest Constituents be
satisfied with metaphysical distinctions? ... We talk of States, till we forget what they
are composed of." I FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 483. See also note 170
supra. Hamilton's view was that "it is a contest for power, not for liberty." 1 FARRAND
RECORDS, supra note 81, at 466. Gerry (Massachusetts) "lamented that instead of
coming here like a band of brothers, belonging to the same family, we seemed to have
brought with us the spirit of political negodators." Id. at 467.
183 See, e.g., S. BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT (1913); E. DOAN, THE LA
FOLLETTES AND THE WISCONSIN IDEA (1947); D. MILLER, JACKSONIAN ARISTOC-
RACY: CLASS AND DEMOCRACY IN NEW YORK, 1830-60 (1967); A. SCHLESINGER,
THE AGE OF JACKSON (1946).
184 Jefferson may not, technically, be so termed, but there is no doubt of his views
and influence. For example, consider the following quotes from Jefferson: "I con-
sider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all authority in that
nation .... "; "All authority belongs to the people"; 'Unless the mass retains sufficient
control over those intrusted with the powers of their government, these will be per-
verted to their own oppression .... Whether our Constitution has hit on the exact
degree of control necessary is yet under experiment"; 'The people are the only censors
of their governors"; "Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the
people alone. The people themselves, therefore, are its only safe depositories"; and,
"Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass .... " Finally,
while the "people are not qualified to legislate for execute]," "they are qualified to
name the person[s) who shall exercise" this power. THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA.
686-90 (J. Foley ed. 1900).
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Madison's records of the Convention debates 85 disclose that al-
most immediately after the delegates convened Randolph (Virginia)
"opened the main business." He first discussed what "such a gov-
ernme[ntl [sicI ought to secure," and mentioned as one "to p[ro]
cure to the several States various blessings." The Resolutions (Vir-
ginia Plan) he proposed suggested the Articles of Confederation
"be so corrected & enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed
by their institution," although the very next day he urged that "a
Union of the States merely federal" would not be able to accom-
plish those objects. Pinckney (South Carolina) submitted the draft
of a plan immediately after Randolph had discussed his own, and
this was to be "between the free and independent States of America."
This second proposal was also referred to the Committee of the
Whole House, which was to consider the first plan.'86 For the next
2 weeks, the proposals, without the language in the eventual
preamble, occupied the time of the delegates, but on June 15th
Patterson (New Jersey) presented his own plan "to be substituted
in place of that proposed by Mr. Randolp." The new proposals
did not refer to the above language and it seems that the Preamble
was completely ignored in the ensuing debates. 7
185 Found in 1-4 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81.
186 1 id. at 18-33. The Pinckney Plan was apparently mislaid by the official secre-
tary of the Convention (he was one William Jackson, who was nominated by Hamilton,
and won over Wilson's nominee by a 5-2 vote, id. at 4), but a supposed copy was later
supplied by the author; this had a preamble and 16 articles, the former opening, "We
the People of the States of ... do ordain, declare & establish the following Constitution."
3 id. at 595. Prof. Farrand appends a lengthy analysis based upon a variety of facts
concerning the authenticity of this language, as well as the other items, and concludes
that "[c]ombining all of these sources of information it is possible to obtain a fairly
good idea of the Pinckney Plan in its original form." Id. at 604. His reconstruction
discloses the Preamble to open: "A Confederation between the free and independent
States of New Hampshire & is hereby solemnly made...." Id. at 604; see 2 id. at 134.
We adopt Farrand's views. I id. at 242.
187 Hamilton's Convention views originally did not include a preamble; his final
draft did, and is of interest because he nowhere offers any reason for his apparently radi-
cal change, i.e., aristocratic to democratic. Madison describes Hamilton's first lengthy
discussion in the Convention on June 18th, at the conclusion of which he offered "the
paper he had sketched" as "a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amend-
ments which he should probably propose to the plan of Mr. Randolph .... He reads
his sketch in the words following: to wit. 'I: The supreme Legislative Power .... "
1 J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 185 (Scott ed. 1894). A
footnote, id. at 187, informs that this speech was "taken down and written out, [and]
was seen by Mr. Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal changes,
which were made as he suggested." 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 293. El-
liot's Debates as well as Koch's 1966 reprinting of Tansill's edition, all give the preced-
ing identical language (with minor punctuation differences), and the government's
Documentary History is similarly almost identical sans the footnote explanation. Com-
pare id., with 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, at 204-05, and 3 U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 149 (1874). 3 FARI-AND
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On July 26th all plans, resolutions, et cetera were referred to
the Committee of Detail, and the Convention adjourned until Au-
gust 6th to permit it to prepare a draft of a constitution. This
Committee was composed of Rutledge as Chairman, Randolph, Gor-
ham, Ellsworth, and Wilson. 88 Randolph had proposed the Vir-
ginia Plan, Wilson, as we shall see, made drafts of his own8 9 and,
perhaps, cooperated with Gouverneur Morris on the final lan-
guage;' Rutledge checked all documents and worked on them;
and Ellsworth favored "the necessity of maintaining the existence
& agency of the States."' 9 ' Professor Farrand lists the documents
considered by or in that Committee, amongst which is one "in the
handwriting of Edmund Randolph with emendations by John Rut-
ledge."' 92 This document seems to be Randolph's notes and views,
and indicates that he felt that "A preamble seems proper. Not for
the purpose of designating the ends of government and human
polities" or for "mutually pledging the faith of the parties for the
observance of the articles," but to "declare, that the present foederal
government is insufficient to the general happiness .... ."9 ' Inter
alia Randolph also referred to the fact that the Convention was
"not working on the natural rights of men not gathered into so-
ciety, but upon those rights, modified by society, and ... interwoven
with what we call ... the rights of states . . . ."'" Another docu-
ment is in "Wilson's handwriting Eand] was found among the
RECoRnS, supra note 81, at 619 sets forth a "Copy of a paper Communicated to J.M. by
Col. Hamilton, about the close of the Convention," but it is here added "which he said
delineated the Constitution which we would have wished to be proposed by the Conven-
tion: He had stated the principles of it in the course of deliberations." Now, for the
first time, a preamble is found, but in view of the preceding it appears that Hamilton's
later thoughts were not necessarily his original ones. This is especially so when his later
full Constitution and his original "sketch" are compared, for the Constitution is now
given at length and in detail and is apparently a somewhat complete document. Never-
theless, Hamilton's preamble is: "The people of the United States of America do ordain
& establish this Constitution for the government of themselves and their posterity." Id.
1882 id. at 106. On the chairmanship, see id. at xxii. Ellsworth's son claimed that
his father said the Constitution "was drawn by himself and five others, viz - General
Alexander Hamilton, Gorham of Mass, deceased, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Rut-
ledge of South Carolina and Madison of Virginia." 3 id. at 397.
189 Farrand terms him "an important member." I id. at xxii.
190 Notes 196-98 infra.
191 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 406. According to Pierce of Georgia,
Gorham was "of very good sense, but not much improved in his education ...." 3
id. at 87. Apparently, as to content or draftsmanship, Gorham contributed nothing of
major importance here.
192 2 id. at 137 n.6. See also 4 id. at 37 n.6; 1 id. at xxiii n.36.
193 2 id. at 137-38. The changes are given in 4 id. at 38.
194 2 id at 137-38.
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Wilson Papers. It appears to be the beginning of a draft with an
outline of the continuation."' 5  The second column of this draft,
as given by Farrand, opens: "We The People of the States of . . .
do . . . ordain and establish the following . . . Frame of Govt. as
the Constitution . . . of the said United States."' 96  The views of
Randolph as given above, the composition of the Committee and
the internal evidence of the documents before them, bolstered by
the fact that Rutledge, who worked on both Randolph's and Wil-
son's documents,' now, on behalf of the Committee, delivered its
report to the Convention, permits the conclusion that the exact
language in the Preamble at this stage was a stepchild, and that this
Committee gave it birth or, at least, was the midwife,'98 although
influenced by the Virginia delegation's presentation of an uncon-
scious accommodation between the statists and the populists. Re-
gardless, the Committee reported on August 6th that it was "We
the people of the States of. .. [who] do ordain, declare, and estab-
lish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves
and our Posterity.""'
The path traversed by this Preamble indicates a degree of Con-
vention indifference to its language and, perhaps, implications."o
395 Id. at 150 n.13.
196 Id. at 150. Another document so found in Wilson's papers and in his handwrit-
ing opens: "We the People of (and) the States of... do ordain," and so on. A paren-
thesized word, according to Farrand, was "crossed out" while "[i]talics represent later
insertions." Id. at n.14. In this case both apparently occurred. Cf. still another such
document by Wilson (emendations by Rutledge) but now without the "and." Id. at
163. And see text next following on the Report of the Committee of Detail.
197 See authorities cited notes 192-96 supra.
198 Warren states that "an entirely new Preamble had been drafted." C. WARREN,
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 687 (1928). Technically this may be correct,
but in principle it is not; the Preamble vacillated between the opposing State-people
views expressed in the Convention and attempted to create a mean acceptable to both,
i.e., that it was the people, but of the States, who were now creating the Constitution.
199 2 FARRAND REcoIRs, supra note 81, at 177. All 13 states were named. The
Government's records disclose that the printed (tentative) draft of the Constitution re-
ceived from the President March 19, 1796 opens, "We the People of the States" enum-
erated, "do ordain and establish ... [this) government of Ourselves and our Posterity."
1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 187, at 285. The preposition "of," not "for," is
meaningful. Pinckney, in 1818, forwarded to the Department of State his own Conven-
tion draft, the opening language being almost identical with the preceding, as is Brear-
ley's opening language. Id. at 312, 338; See note 187 supra, (Hamilton's apparent lan-
guage).
200 But see C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 229 (1966); C. VAN
DOREN, supra note 165, at 161; text accompanying note 211 infra. Rossiter feels
"We ought not attach too much significance to this change [discussed below], for it"
was required by the inability to foretell which nine States would ratify. See note 212
infra. However, and apparently in disagreement with his preceding comment he con-
cludes "Thus, somewhat fortuitously, 'We the people of the United States' became the
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The day after the report the Preamble "was agreed to nem. con." ''
For the next full month each proposed article and clause was dis-
cussed, new compromises fashioned, and finally, on September 8th,
a Committee of Style was appointed "to revise the stile of and ar-
range the articles which had been agreed to ... ." The Committee
was composed of Johnson (Connecticut) as Chairman, Hamilton
(New York), Gouverneur Morris (Pennsylvania), Madison (Vir-
ginia), and King (Massachusetts)."' Undoubtedly Morris gave the
"finish," as Madison put it, to "the style and arrangement of the
Constitution '"20 but, regardless of authorship at this moment, the
new Committee reported out a Constitution on September 12th, the
completely new Preamble beginning "We, the People of the United
States .... "204 One writer feels that this change
did nor have for the delegates who noted it when it was read, quite
the implications which are now sometimes found in it... The
change was primarily in the interests of accuracy. But what bad
been done for the sake of accuracy had the effect of making it
appear that the Constitution was by and for the united people, not
by and for the confederated states 205
nominal as well as real sovereign source of the Constitution." C. Rossrrmt, supra at
229.
2012 FARRAND REcoRDs, supra note 81, at 196. The convention record states
"it passed unan: in the affirmative." Id. at 193.
202 2 id. at 553. On the chairmanship, see 1 id. at xxiii. Professor Farrand terms
Morris one of "the most important members." Id. That gentlemen in 1814 wrote that
"It]hat instrument [the Constitution] was written by the fingers, which write this let-
rer." Id. at 420. Morris wrote in 1811 that "General Hamilton had little share in
forming the Constitution." Id. at 418.
203 Id. at 499. In a letter written April 8, 1831, to Jared Sparks who was engaged
in writing a life of Morris and who had asked for information as to the latter's participa-
tion in the Convention. Wilson's influence is also suggested. 2 id. at 150 n.13; see C.
WARREN, supra note 156, at 8 n.1; C. WARREN, supra note 198, at 637-38. The diary
of Ezra Stiles for Dec. 21, 1787, giving delegate Baldwin's (Georgia) account, states
that "Messrs Morris & Wilson had the chief hand in the last Arrangt & Composition."
3 id. at 170.
204 Id. at 590. Save for minor punctuation and spelling differences the language
so reported is identical with that finally adopted and eventually ratified. Warren traces
the genesis of this phraseology to several existing State constitutions. C. WARREN, supra
note 156, at 393 n.1.
2 05 Van Doren continues:
In a sense, the Constitution went back rather to a Declaration of Independence
than to the Articles of Confederation. The Articles nowhere referred to the
people of the United States but always to the "United States in Congress as-
sembled." The Declaration had spoken of "one people" and "our people"
and had acted "by the authority of the good people of these Colonies."
There is no record of any objection to the Preamble, which was adopted
without a change. C. VAN DOREN, supra note 165, at 161.
The "sense" in which the author discusses the preceding is, to this writer, not ac-
ceptable.
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For the next 5 days and until Franklin observed, while the Consti-
tution was finally being signed, that it was a rising and not a set-
ting sun painted at the back of Washington's chair, the delegates
continued to debate various of the proposed articles; nowhere,
however, is the Preamble mentioned or referred to.2"' Thirty-seven
years later Madison referred to the "general terms or phrases used
in the introductory propositions . . . [which] were never meant to
be inserted in their loose form in the text of the Constitition.'2 °7
This, however, never occurred for the Preamble, i.e., the State-
people "compromise," was broadened into the looser phraseology
finally adopted.
This compromise did not go unnoticed in the later ratifying 0"
conventions. For example, in Virginia Patrick Henry demanded
"Who authorized them [the delegates] to speak the language of,
We, the people, instead of, We, the states? ... If the states be not
the agents of this compact, it must be one great, consolidated, na-
tional government, of the people of all the states." To this Ran-
dolph asked,
Why not? The government is for the people; and the misfortune
was, that the people had no [direct] agency in the government be-
fore. The Congress had power [from the States] .... If the
government is to be binding on the people, are not the people
the proper persons to examine its merits or defects?
And Mason also replied to Henry, that "the present clause clearly
discovers that it is a national government, and no longer a Confed-
eration [of States] . . . " But, countered Henry, "The style of the
206 Franklin's motion, on September 17th, that the Constitution be signed, was car-
ried. Note 81 supra. However, his "convenient form" (suggested "by Mr. G.M. in
order to gain the dissenting members"), "Done in Convention, by the unanimous con-
sent of the States present," id. at 643 (italics in the original), was apparently ignored.
Madison's notes also state that this ambiguous form had been "put into the hands of
Docr. Franklin that it might have the better chance of success." Warren puts it even
more strongly. C. WARREN, supra note 198, at 711. The clause did have some effect,
e.g., Blount (N.C.) reversed himself because "he was relieved by the form proposed,"
although Pinckney felt "[w]e are not likely to gain many converts by the ambiguity of
the proposed form of signing .... " 2 FARRAND REcoRDs, supra note 81, at 646, 647,
He and Butler, therefore, rejected "the equivocal form of the signing, and on that account
voted in the negative" on the motion to sign, although both later did actually sign the
document. Id. at 647, 665.
-207 9 WRr NGs OF JAMES MADISON 176-77 (Hunt. ed. 1901). Madison was
speaking of the various plans and resolutions eventually "to be reduced by proper limita-
tions and specifications, into the form in which they were to be final and operative; as
was actually done in the progress of the session."
20SThe questions whether the Constitution was factually ratified, as well as whether
it could have been ratified, by their delegates or by the "people," have been controver-
sial ones. See, e.g., L. HACKER, THE SHAPING OF THE AMERIcAN TRADITION 237-38
(1947).
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government (We, the people) was introduced perhaps to recom-
mend it to the people at large ....
Whether or not a "conspiracy" was present during these days210
is, of course, conjectural. Professor Warren correctly says that "this
change was not intended by the Convention to be anything more
than a matter of form,"21 since the Preamble's first literal naming
of the 13 States separately was because it was originally intended
that all of them would have to ratify, but, when unanimity for ratifi-
cation was dropped, with only nine of the 13 States required, "such
action made it necessary to eliminate from the preamble the names
of the specific States; for it could not be known, at the date of the
signing of the Preamble and the rest of the Constitution by the
delegates, just which of the thirteen States would ratify."'" There
is no question but that all these considerations did enter into the
change, and while Warren and the others so accounting therefor
do not otherwise support their view, we may call attention here to
2093 ELLIoT'S DBBATEs, supra note 121, at 22, 28,29, 148 respectively (emphasis in
original). Elliot contains Mason's "clause" referring to the power of "laying direct
taxes," for which he desired amendments. Pendleton also entered the discussion, asking
of Henry:
who but the people can delegate powers? Who but the people have a right to
form government? The expression is a common one, and a favorite one with
me. The representatives of the people, by their authority, is a mode wholly
unessential. If the objection be, that the Union ought to be not of the people,
but of the state governments, then I think the choice of the former very happy
and proper. What have the state governments to do with it? Were they to
determine, the people would not, in that case, be the judges upon what terms
it was adopted. Id. at 37.
Lee felt that "[t]his expression was introduced ... with great propriety." Id. at 42.
For additional discussions see id. at 44 (Henry); id. at 94 (Madison); id. at 98 (Nicho-
las); id. at 104 (Corbin); id. at 180 (Lee).
210 See authorities cited note 163 supra.
211 C. WAIRREN, supra note 798, at 394; see note 200 supra.
212 Hence, the language, '"We, the people of the United States," was used, the
meaning being, "We, the people of the States united," i.e., the people of those
States which should agree to unite, by ratifying the new Constitution. "No
other intent was suggested or contemplated" by this change of language. [Re-
ferring to 1 R. FOSTER, CoMioNTARmS oF TBE CONST ION 43, 94
(1895). In 1882 Stephens, made exactly the same analysis, with a second
point being discussed at note 216 infra. A. STmPHm s, PIcrORIAL HISTORY
OF TBE UNTrED STATES 312-13 (1882).] The idea that 'We, the people
of the United States" was intended to mean the people, as a whole, of the
country known as the United States of America, irrespective of the States of
which the people were citizens, was an idea which did not enter the heads of
the delegates at the time. C. WARREN, supra note 198, at 395.
Warren 'then instances Daniel Webster's later development of this theory, and of Pat-
rick Henry's like remonstrances against such language, quoting the latter's refutation
by Henry Lee and, in effect, the following quotation of Madison is the basis for War-
ren's views. On Henry and Lee see 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 121, 44, 180, and
on Madison see 1 J. MADISON, supra note 187, at 48.
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the first sentence of clause 3, in article I, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion which originally. spoke of the apportionment of representa-
tives and direct taxes "among the several States which may be in-
cluded within this Union .... "
However, certain questions may still be propounded: why could
not the original naming of the 13 States have been remedied by
simply inserting, in their place, "ratifying this Constitution;" so as
to read, "We, the People of the States ratifying this Constitution;"
or how could the initial Convention problem of jurisdiction based
upon States or people 14 otherwise be resolved; or why in every ar-
ticle of the Constitution are the States mentioned and discussed but
not so for the "people;" or why do the above references to the part
played in drafting the Constitution by Gouverneur Morris (and
James Wilson) give the implications they do; and why were delib-
erate ambiguities allowed to remain in the final document"1 5
all these questions still remain unanswered.1 6 This "expression
213 See notes 170-75 supra and accompanying text; note 215 infra.
214 Cf. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW 342-43 & n.50 (1956). But see
C. WARREN, supra note 198, at 394-96.
215 E.g., "Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning of direct (sic) taxation?
No one answd." 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 350. The "direct Taxes"
were eventually included in the first sentence of article I, section 2, clause 3, although
later removed by section 2 of the 14th amendment, and also the 16th amendment. In
what eventually became article I, section 1, clause 6, where the President's removal from
office, et cetera is treated, the phrase also appears, "or of his death, Resignation, or In-
ability to discharge his functions." The Committee of Detail's Report to the Convention
on August 6, 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 186, contained the word "disabil-
ity," and on the later discussion of this portion of the report Dickinson seconded a mo-
tion for its postponement, which was unanimously agreed to, "remarking that it was
too vague. What is the extent of the term 'disability' & who is to be the judge of it?"
Id. at 427. That he was correct is disclosed by the eventual 25th amendment.
216 Another question, not further discussed, is suggested by Stephens when he claims
that the original language reported by the Committee of Detail (note 199 supra), and
even as later redrafted by the Committee of Style for today's Constitution (note 204
supra), still does not reject the conclusion that nevertheless the Convention's finished
product "was intended to be a Constitution made by States and for States .... " He
argues that the original establishment by "We, the people ...for the Government of
Ourselves and our Posterity" of the new nation permits the inference "that it was in-
tended, as has been construed, that it was a Constitution for the people of the United
States in mass, as one consolidated Republic. But the substituted words preclude that
inference" because, he suggests, the new language is that "We, the People of the United
States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America"
and not "for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity," i.e., it is for the United
States as a grouping of States and not for ourselves as a mass of people. A. STEPHENS,
supra note 212, at 313-14. On a pre-Convention aspect see Madison's views in the in-
troduction of his Journal: "As a sketch on paper, the earliest, perhaps, of a Constitutional
Government for the Union ... to be sanctioned by the people of the States, acting in
their original and sovereign character, was contained in the letters of James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson." 1 J. MADISON, supra note 187, at 48.
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[which] is a common one"21  did not originate, full blown, in the
Convention, therefore, but seemingly was able to be seized upon
and used - that is, if any conspiracy existed. Furthermore, War-
ren's language does not limit "people of the States united," so that
in effect his term is still ambiguously broad, i.e., is it the "voting
people of the States united," or is it the "entire people of the
States united"? Even conceding the correctness of his interpretation
it does not follow that his "people" is a limited one; and the en-
tire tenor of this article discloses such a limitation, with which con-
clusion he does not disagree. Even the language used in other
places in the Constitution not only does not negate these conclu-
sions but, in effect, bolsters them. For example, article I, section 4
vests all national legislative powers in a Congress, with section 2,
clause 1 requiring Representatives to be chosen "by the People of
the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of
the State Legislature"; so does, or did, clause 3 apportioning rep-
resentatives and direct taxes among the States, as quoted above;...
and section 3, clause 1 requires that Senators be "chosen by the
Legislature" of each State.219 For even conceding a populist desire
to broaden "people" in the Preamble into a totality, the Federal
Legislature here is restricted in its source of power not only to each
State's determination of electoral qualifications but, for the Senate,
these same and qualified electors have no direct voice in such choos-
ing. The Preamble's "People," therefore, cannot be aught but a
restricted term20 in the light of its formulation and adoption in the
Convention, as well as in the light of its understanding and use by
the delegates22 and its subsequent ratification. 2
217 See note 206 supra.218 Text accompanying note 167 supra.
219 The first sentence of clause 1 of the 17th amendment, of course, requires that
Senators be "elected by the people" of the States, with the second sentence continuing:
"The electors in each State shall have the qualifications" and so on as quoted in the article,
the only difference being a plural "s" added to the Constitutional "Legislature."
220 To clarify, meanings and understandings the term "people" is qualified by using
"political" as an adjective; this creates a new term and brings to mind the analogy by
Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497, 509 (1965): "One
of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right
is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word
or words more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning." See also United
States v. International UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
221 The Federalist, of course, is undoubtedly the most important contemporary in-
terpretation of the Constitutional language; all of its essays were, of course, predicated
on the assumption that the ultimate security of the rights of the people lay in the fact
that power was in the hands of their representatives. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIsT No.
17, at 178 n. (Cooked. 1961) (Hamilton).
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The confusions and ambiguities surrounding the understanding
and use of the term "people" in the Convention did not cease with
the termination of that body. Most of the delegates continued in
public life in one capacity or another, and many were returned to
the First Congress. 3 That group found awaiting them demands
for amendments, whether expressed in the State conventions224 or
even set forth in some detail in the formal notices of ratification.225
222 See, e.g., C. BEARD, AN EcoNoMIc INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
ch. 9 (1913). Beard details the popular vote on ratification and, concerning the Conven-
tion itself, stating that whether or not it "should be held was not submitted to a popu-
lar vote, and that it was not specially passed upon by the electors in choosing the mem-
bers of the legislature which selected the delegates." Id. at 239; see id. at 71-72. On
"Popular ratification," he states that while the "referendum was not unknown at that
time .... it was not a fixed principle of American politics" and does not seem to have
been thought of by the delegates. Beard also notes, among other things, the disenfran-
chisement of adult males by qualifications, already discussed heretofore, and the apathy
and lack of understanding (which seems a trifle strange), and cites one author's con-
clusions on Massachusetts that while about 16 to 17 percent of the population was en-
titied to vote, only 3 percent participated in 1780. This dropped to 2 percent by 1784
and even lower until Shay's Rebellion brought it up to 5 to 6 percent in 1787; then it
dropped to between 3 to 4 percent until 1794. C. BEARD, supra at 242-43. He then
goes into other figures elsewhere, but his overall conclusion is that "it seems a safe guess
to say that not more than 5 per cent of the population in general, or in round numbers,
160,000 voters, expressed an opinion one way or another on the Constitution .... If
anything, this estimate is high." Id. at 250. See A. McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE
FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 487-90 (1905).
223 See note 139 supra.
224 Some States merely ratified without more, e.g., Delaware, Pennsylvania, Con-
necticut, Maryland, South Carolina; others were a bit more lengthy hut in effect also
merely ratified, e.g., New Jersey, Georgia; others first ratified and then either continued
with suggested or requested amendments or else appended these to a ratifying document,
e.g., Massachusetts, New Hampshire, while one insisted that such "ought to be laid be-
fore Congress, and the Convention... for... Amending the said Constitution, for their
consideration, previous to the Ratification .. . on the part of the State of North Caro-
lina," and then nevertheless concluded with an adoption and ratification paragraph;
Virginia set forth certain "impressions" in the form of statements of rights, and so on,
and "with a hope of obtaining Amendments previous to the Ratification," did "assent
to and ratify the Constitution," as did Rhode Island, which had boycotted the Conven-
tion, while New York's ratification went even slightly beyond such hortatory language.
On these ratifications see 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 187, at 24, 25, 46, 65, 87,
93, 121, 138, 141, 145, 190, 266, 310. See also L. TRENHOLME, THE RATIFICATION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 237-46 (1932); PENNsYL-
VANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 248-50 (J. McMaster & W. Stone eds. 1888);
note 225 infra.
225 See, e.g., Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND.
L.J. 309, 314-18 (1936). The formal Massachusetts ratifying document first ratified
in paragraph 1, and then was followed in paragraph 2 by "the opinion of this Conven-
tion that certain amendments & alterations in the said Constitution would remove fears
& quiet the apprehensions of many of the good people of this Commonwealth & more
effectually guard against an undue administration of the Federal Government. The
Convention do therefore recommend that the following" become amendments. The first
such was: "That it be explicitly declared that all Powers not expressly delegated by the
aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several States to be by them exercised." 2 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 187, at 93-94. New Hampshire's phraseology was almost
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IV. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE NINTH
AND 10TH AMENDMENTS
The absence 6 of a Bill of Rights227 had been a political issue
jeopardizing ratification;2 2 it was not that the people in the original
identical in both respects, with only "& particularly' preceding "delegated." Id. at
141-42. For analogous phraseology, see that of North Carolina, id. at 270, and of Rhode
Island, id. at 316. New York's ratification was preceded by a lengthy statement of "im-
pressions" which included:
That all Power is originally vested in and consequently derived from the Peo-
ple .... that every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the
departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People of the several
States, or to their respective State Governments to whom they may have
granted the same; And that those clauses in the said Constitution, which de-
dare, that Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not imply
that Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution ....
Id. at 190-91.
Virginia's "impressions" included the statement "that the powers granted under the
Constitution being derived from the People ... may be resumed" when perverted, "and
that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will .... " Id. at
145.
In other words, the amendment desired by Massachusetts reserved the powers to the
States, that of Virginia to the People, and New York's combined both. See also Madi-
son's proposed amendment note 265 infra.
220 A proposal in the Convention "for a Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights"
was rejected 10 to 0, with one State absent. 2 FARAND RECORDS, supra note 81, at 588.
227 For purposes of clarification this distinguishes at length the various types and
kinds of "rights" possible in areas other than legal. X. FORKOSCH, supra note 214, at
325. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding invalid a miscegena-
tion statute preventing intermarriage because marriage is one of the "basic civil rights
of man .... "; note 19 supra (human rights). Insofar as constitutional rights, includ-
ing those in the amendments, have not been extended to all persons, see note 271 infra.
Mr. Justice Fortas' suggestion of a category of "nonpersons" is, for this purpose, valid.
Fortas, Equal Rights - For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L REV. 401, 405 (1967). Chafee
feels that "all rights in the Constitution are really human rights, since they are exercised
by human beings against human beings," and that "the most important human rights
provision in the Constitution" is found in article I, section 9, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. He states, however, that "we can pretty much ignore great parts of
the Constitution which deal with political rights . . . " i.e., there are different kinds of
rights in the Constitution, including property rights. Z. CHAFEE, JI., How HUMAN
RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 1, 2, 51 (1952).
What amendments are covered by a "Bill of Rights," and even whether such term
is so limited and does not include constitutional clauses, are also questions not further
discussed, e.g., Learned Hand includes the first eight amendments plus the 14th within
the term. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1 (1958). Roscoe Pound, on the other
hand, prefers only the first nine. R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES AND LIBERTY 199 (1957). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343 (1963), quoting from a 1936 case, in effect holding the Bill of Rights to be
the first eight amendments "also safeguarded" by the 14th, i.e., accepting land's view.
228 See, e.g., C. WARREN, supra note 127, at 769. Warren states that the first of
our four "basic fears" in regard to the Constitution was
the omission of a Bill of Rights and the lack of a definite provision that all
powers not expressly granted to the National Government were reserved to
the States. The demand for a Bill of Rights was regarded very generally, even
by supporters of the Constitution, as justified.
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States were not living under their own bills of rights,229 but if there
were now to be a separate government operating directly upon
them and with powers other and different from (and greater than)
those of the States, was not such a guarantee of rights all the more
required?23 Why the people in a territory should be so nationally,
i.e., federally, favored231 and not those in the original States could
not be explained away, even by Hamilton's ingenious phrases." 2
See also C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT
79-85 (1928).
It may be noted that Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts finally ratified the Bill
of Rights in 1939.
229 E.g., eight of the States so expressly provided a bill of rights, and three others
which had no such formal bill had, in their constitutions, similar provisions. Mason,
who in 1776 had authored Virginia's bill, the first such in the State constitutions, was
naturally for such a Bill in the Convention, and "[h]e wished the plan had been pref-
aced with a Bill of Rights, & would second a Motion if made for the purpose - It
would give great quiet to the people; and with the aid of the State declarations, a bill
might be prepared in a few hours." 2 FAlutAN RECORDS, supra note 81, at 587-88.
Randolph, Mason, and Gerry refused to sign the eventual document, one of their reasons
being the lack of a Bill of Rights. See id. at 633, 637. Madison's views concerning
the efficacy of these State safeguards is found in his speech in the House of Representa-
tives on behalf of his proposed amendments, June 8, 1789. "Besides, some States have
no bills of rights, there are others provided with very defective ones, and there are others
whose bills of rights are not only defective, but absolutely improper ...." 1 ANNALS
supra note 164, at 439.
230 In the first Congress Madison's introductory remarks to the proposed Bil of
Rights included the statement that "[t)he people of many States have thought it neces-
sary to raise barriers against power in all forms and departments of Government. . -
Id. at 436.
231 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 contained a requirement that "the following
Articles shall be considered as Articles of compact, between the Original States and the
people and States in the said territory .... Amongst these were freedom of worship
and religious sentiments (article I), habeas corpus, jury, a formulation of due process
(article II), and a rejection of slavery (except for one "from whom labor or service is
lawfully claimed in any one of the original States .... ") (article VI). 32 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 at 339-40, 343 (R. Hill ed. 1787); see note
176 supra (extradition). The first Congress under the Constitution, on August 7, 1789,
enacted chapter VIII which recited a desire to have the 1787 Ordinance "continue to
have full effect," and so "it is requisite that certain provisions should be made, so as to
adapt the same to the present Constitution . 1..." I Star. 51. The enacting sections 1
and 2 dealt briefly with other specific matters in the Ordinance and, in effect, if the
Northwest Ordinance did not survive the inception of the new government then tech-
nically this first statute did not reenact or continue it. Neither did the Act of May 8,
1792, 1 Stat. 285, nor the Act of April 30, 1802, 2 Stat. 173, although all three statutes
assumed the continuation of the provisions and restrictions.
23 2 THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Hamilton); id. No. 84, at 569 (P. Ford ed. 1898)
(Hamilton). He argued that "bills of rights are, in their origina, stipulations between
kings and their subjects," whereas "[h]ere, in strictness, the people surrender nothing;
and, as they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations." Id. at 572,
573. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 489 n.4 (concurring opinion), Justice
Goldberg quotes additionally and, referring to the ninth and 10th amendments, says that
these "were apparently also designed in part to meet the above-quoted argument of
Hamilton."
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Promises to amend the Constitution thus became due bills.. for
presentation to the opening session of the First Congress."' This
body therefore proposed 12 amendments," 5 although only 10 be-
came fundamental law.
The internal Congressional procedures and debates on these pro-
posals are illuminating. The initial attempt to amend was exactly
1 month after a Congressional quorum met. On May 4, 1789,
Madison gave notice to the House "that he intended to bring on
the subject of amendments to the Constitution,"23 but the follow-
ing day Bland (Virginia) presented an application by that State's
legislature for amendments, thereby following the alternative
amending procedures of article V. 37 The application referred to
the Constitution's "defects... as involving the great and unalien-
able rights of freemen," but there were objections to its considera-
tions until the proper number of States "concurred in similar appli-
cations .... ."3  On June 8th Madison reminded the House of his
earlier desire to propose amendments and moved the body resolve
itself into a Committee of the Whole;3 ' he encountered opposi-
tion to this procedure but nevertheless gave his reasons for amend-
ments and then set forth his"'0 proposals, the first of which was that
2 3 3 Mr. Justice Roberts, after leaving the bench, spoke of the "moral commitment"
of Congress to propose amendments. Roberts, American Constitutional Government,
in THE GASPER G. BACON LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
391 (1953).
234 C. WARREN, supra note 228, at 99, calls this "almost an adjourned session of
the Federal Convention of 1787. In this First Congress, ten of the eighteen Senators,
and eight members of the House had been among the fifty-five members of that Con-
vention;' and five Senators and 26 Representatives were members of State ratifying con-
ventions.
235 These were preceded by an explanatory paragraph:
The Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopt-
ing the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction
or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should
be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the govern-
ment will best ensure the beneficient ends of its institution .... 2 U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, supra note 187, at 321.
230 1 ANNALS, supra note 164, at 247.
2 37 See generally Forkosch, The Alternative Amending Clause in Article V: Sug-
gestions on Powers and Procedures, 51 MINN. L. REv. 1053 (1967).
233 Madison also "doubted the propriety of" the procedures, and these are discussed
more fully in the preceding reference. Id.
239 1 ANNALS, supra note 164, at 424.
240 Madison had opposed adding a bill of rights during the ratification period, as he
feared delay in ratification, but, as put by him, he "thought a bill of rights has a certain
value . E.."  BURNS, JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 80
(1934). Rutland discusses Madison's almost enthusiastic conversion and his "promise"
to the voters to propose amendments. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 195-97 (1955). As the present debates show, he was undoubt-
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there be "prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that all power
is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the peo-
ple."24' Additionally he desired that in article I, section 9, certain
clauses (most later incorporated in the Bill of Rights) be inserted,
two of which are given in full below.242 The first such was not
mentioned in his treatment of the group of clauses, and the second
was supported as follows:
I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the State
[ratifying] conventions, that several are particularly anxious that
it should be declared in the Constitution, that the powers not
therein delegated should be reserved to the several States. Per-
haps other words may define this more precisely than the whole
of the instrument now does. I admit they may be deemed un-
necessary; but there can be no harm in making such a declara-
tion .... 243
He thereupon moved to appoint a committee so that eventually
Congress might propose amendments, whereupon opposition and
extended debate occurred but the motion of another member, to
refer Madison's motion to the Committee of the Whole, was car-
ried.244  The following July 21st Madison succeeded in bringing
the matter up again, but a select committee (one member from each
State) of the Committee of the Whole was now appointed to take
up the subject generally and report back.245 On August 13th the
House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole to discuss the
report of the select group and at once ran into the problem of form
- Madison's proposals were to insert a variety of clauses within
the Constitution, whereas now it was suggested and moved that the
Constitution be left intact and amendments follow at its end. "
Madison felt that "Form, sir, is always of less importance than the
substance; but on this occasion I admit that form is of some con-
sequence .... .""' After discussion the motion was lost and the
edly utilizing the ratifying documents of the States to weed out duplications, irrele-
vancies, and those proposals with which he disagreed. See generally I. BRANT, JAMES
MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800, at 264-75 (1950), for a treat-
ment of Madison's congressional difficulties in bringing up the proposals, and his feeling
"that so great a charter of liberties should have come from a man who had no sponta-
neous urge to provide it." Id. at 275.
241 1 ArNALS, supra note 164, at 433.
242 Text accompanying note 265 infra.
248 1 ANNALS 441.
2441d. at 450.
2451d. at 665.
246Id. at 707.
2471d. at 708.
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House adjourned (although on August 20th the same member
again so moved and this time successfully). 248  The following day
Madison's first proposal, given above, on prefixing a declaration
to the Constitution that all power, and so on, stem from the people,
was taken up. One member objected as this could not be an amend-
ment to the Constitution for its introductory paragraph "is no part
of the Constitution. It is, to say the best, a useless amendment ....
[Blut if the principle is of importance, it may be introduced into
the bill of rights." '249 After a brief discussion the House agreed
(voting 27-23) to adopt the select committee's report that before
"We the people" there be added: "Government being intended for
the benefit of the people, and the rightful establishment thereof
being derived from their authority alone."25
On Madison's proposal concerning rights and exceptions5 1 the
select committee proposed "The enumeration in this Constitution
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people," and practically without debate this was
adopted by the Committee of the Whole;252 thereafter, and on Au-
gust 21st, it was this eighth proposition which was "agreed to" by
the full House, and now without any debate whatsoever.25 On his
proposal concerning the nondelegation of powers and reservation
to the States,5  the select committee's report was identical in lan-
248 Id. at 766.
249 Id. at 718.
260 Id. at 707.
251 Madison's proposals are given at note 265 infra.
252 1 ANNALS 754. Patterson gives this report in full but incorrectly uses "the
Constitution" instead of "this Constitution," and says that this "exact language was
never changed thereafter .... ." B. PA'rRsoN, ThE FoRGonT NhnTH AmvEND-
MENT 14 (1955). In this he is in error. See also the change from "this" to "the" in the
10th amendment, note 255 infra. The reason for these changes is correctly given by
Patterson with respect to other items, and this is that at the outset Madison desired to
interweave his amendments with, and into, the actual text of the Constitution; with the
later rejection of this proposal, "this" had to be changed, as now the language was out-
side, not inside, the actual Constitution, and was supplementary to it.
253 1 ANNALS 767. The reasons given by Madison for desiring this original amend-
ment were:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating par-
ticular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights
which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implica-
tion, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be as-
signed into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard
urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I con-
ceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen
may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution. Id. at 439.
254Note 265 infra.
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guage255 and the only change in the Committee of the Whole was
in this fashion, with no debate or explanation: "Mr. Carroll pro-
posed to add to the end of the proposition, 'or to the people;' this
was agreed to." Thereafter, in the House itself, there was now in-
serted "to the United States" after "delegated," so that its language
became identical with the 10th amendment finally ratified, and this
was also "adopted without debate." '5  The following day the com-
mittee appointed to arrange the amendments reported to the House
which adopted them and sent them to the Senate for concurrence.257
On August 25th, 1 day later, the Senate received the House's
17 proposed amendments, and on September 2d began an extremely
short consideration and even shorter discussion. For example, the
entire period to September 9th discloses "consideration" given to
the proposed amendments only on September 2d, 4th, 7th, 8th, and
9th, with other items also being discussed and debated. On this last
day the entirety of the proceedings are summed up in the statement
that the Senate "agreed to a part of them, and disagreed to others;
of which they informed the House."2"8  The following day the
House received this message, discussed the Senate's proposals on the
19th, 59 and on the 21st agreed to some and requested a conference
to iron out the remaining disagreements. 6 On the 24th the House
discussed the report of its Committee of Conference and receded
from its disagreements in all respects save two (plus a minor
third); " '61 the Senate, on September 25th,.62 now concurred." 3
Of the 12 proposals so finally agreed264 upon 10 were ratified,
and the ninth and 10th amendments respectively are: "The enumer-
ation in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
255 Only "this" Constitution was changed to "the." On the ninth amendment,
see note 252 supra. A proposed amendment was lost and is not here discussed.
256 1 ANNALS 768. A motion to insert "expressly" before "delegated" was de-
feated.
257 Id. at 779.
258 Id. at 77.
259 Id. at 889, 903.
260 Id. at 905.
261 Id. at 913.
262 The Annals gives it as "February 25."
263 Id. at 88.
264 See also note 229 supra.
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the people."2 5  The 10th, of course, has been followed in some
detail through the Congress, but the ninth is singularly lacking in
clarifying debate. As already pointed up, the direct genesis of
the latter is Madison's language concerning rights and exceptions,
amended into its present form and ratified, with explicit congres-
sional reasons for introducing, amending, and proposing sorely ab-
sent.266 Nevertheless, "the people" in the ninth amendment still
retain (other) rights even though only certain ones are enumerated
in the Constitution, for example, article IlI, section 2, clause 3's
requirement of a jury in criminal cases, article IV, section 2, clause
I's entitlement of privileges and immunities to State citizens,
67
while in the 10th amendment all powers not so delegated or pro-
hibited are now so reserved. In effect the first such retention lan-
guage is somewhat loose but not inconsequential for, as we have
already seen, the (political) people are definitely entitled to have
and to exercise, at the very least, their political rights. But the
entirety of the discussion to now indicates that in the ninth amend-
ment such political rights are not the only ones involved, else why
speak of "rights" in the plural, oppose "certain" by "others re-
tained," and not limit the entirety by inserting "political"? Also,
the constitutional enumeration is not limited to political rights so
that the referent of "certain" is -broader than may judicially have
been indicated. " 8 Logically, therefore, the reference in the ninth
205 1 Stat. 97, 98 (1789), In the first Congress Madison's proposed amendments
contained the following:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of par-
ticular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance
of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated
by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as in-
serted merely for greater caution. 1 ANNALS 435.
Another proposal was to insert a new article VII of two paragraphs, the first stating
the doctrine of the separation of powers, and the second as follows: "The powers not
delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively." Id. at 436. Another proposal is set forth at note 225 supra. See
notes 243 & 244 supra on the disposition of the amendment and the reasons for Madi-
son's proposal.
268Judicial adumbration is similarly lacking. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 252,
ch. 5.
267 In Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936), the Government, under
clause 2 of artide IV, section 3 disposed of generated electric power from its dams, one
argument being that the people retained such a right; said the (questionable) majority,
this amendment "does not withdraw the rights which are expressly granted to the Fed-
eral Government."
26s See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947). Two
Justices abstained, Justice Black dissented but did not touch the ninth or 10th amend-
ments, and Justice Douglas dissented "on two of the four matters decided." The bare
majority opinion contained this language:
We accept appellants' contention that the nature of political rights reserved
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amendment to the rights so retained must include substantive ones
other than political,269 and because these other rights are necessarily
vague there is language in one Supreme Court decision terming
them "penumbral."270
That decision is Griswold v. ConnecticutM7' where Justice Doug-
las at one point referred to the first, third, fourth, and fifth amend-
ments, and then casually ended the paragraph by quoting the ninth
- this, and nothing more. Justice Goldberg mentioned this bare
reference but "I add these words to emphasize the relevance of that
Amendment to the Court's holding.' 17'2  The thrust of his lan-
guage was that in the ninth amendment "the Framers did not in-
tend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the
basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed
to the people," 275 and that Justice Black "misses the import of what
I am saying," for the entire Bill of Rights is not incorporated in, nor
is the ninth and its penumbral rights to be applied through, the
14th against the States.
to the people by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are involved. The right
claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a party
official or worker to further his own political views .... Id. at 94.
In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Justice Brennan wrote for six Jus-
tices, with Justice Harlan and Justice Douglas dissenting and Justice Black joining
Justice Douglas. Inter alia the ninth and 10th amendments were referred to briefly,
but Justice Brennan quoted from the Mitchell case:
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are sub-
tracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people.
Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a federal power in-
fringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the in-
quiry must be directed toward the granted power under which the action of
the Union was taken. If granted power is found, necessarily the objection
of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
must fail. Id. at 493 (quoting from United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, supra
at 95-96).
269 They do not embrace the alleged right to acquire property and thereafter em-
ploy it in a lawful business. See Tennessee Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44
(1939).
270 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); note 220 supra (use of sub-
stitute words to alter constitutional guarantees).
271 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see id. at 483, 485 (Douglas, J.); id. at 487 (Goldberg, J.);
id. at 499 (Harlan, J.), for references to "penumbral rights." The 7-2 decision found
Justices Black and Stewart concurring in each other's separate dissents, and Justices
Harlan and White separately writing opinions concurring with Justice Douglas' "ma-
jority" opinion, while Justice Goldberg also joined in the Court's opinion and judgment,
he concurred separately, with the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan joining him; this, in
effect, means that Justice Douglas wrote primarily for himself and Justice Clark, even
though Justice Goldberg's opinion joined.
272 Id. at 487.
273 Id. at 490. A footnote to this sentence states: "The Tenth Amendment sim-
ilarly made clear that the States and the people retained all those powers not expressly
delegated to the Federal Government."
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Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an
independent source of rights protected from infringement by either
the States or the Federal Government. Rather, the Ninth Amend-
ment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental
rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight
amendments274 and an intent that the list of rights included there
not be deemed exhaustive. As any student of this Court's opin-
ions knows, this Court has held, often unanimously, that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain fundamental personal
liberties from abridgment by the Federal Government or the
States .... The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the
Constitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights
should not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other
way simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight
constitutional amendments.27 5
Regardless of the merits of the Goldberg-Black disagreement
concerning any rights found in the ninth amendment,276 it points
up the question whether "the people" in that amendment are lim-
ited ones, as in the Preamble, or else encompass others. The latter
conclusion is here reached, which additionally emphasizes the re-
stricted use of "people" in the Preamble. The reasons why the
ninth amendment's "people" is broader than that in the Preamble
follow upon the preceding analysis. Since there are substantive
rights referred to in the ninth amendment which are nonpolitical,
these rights may be of such a nature that not only do the political
people referred to in the Preamble have them, but they are also
had by nonvoting, nonpolitical people such as aliens and minors.
Despite Justice Black's views that the 14th's due process clause
incorporated the Bill of Rights but was thereby limited in its con-
tent by these latter, 77 he has remained in a minority;27 the High
274 What the Justice should have said is that fundamental rights exist that are not
expressly enumerated in the Constitution or the first eight amendments.
275 381 U.S. at 492 (foomotes omitted). justice Black's dissent contained this lan-
guage:
That [ninth) Amendment was passed, not to broaden the powers of this
Court or any other department of "the General Government," but, as every
student of history knows, to assure the people that the Constitution in all its
provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government . . .Use of any
such broad, undoubted judicial authority [to strike down state laws] would
make of this Court's members a day-to-day constitutional convention. Id.
at 520.
To answer these comments Justice Goldberg referred to "any student of this Court's
opinions," and then added to the quotation given: "I do not see how this broadens the
authority of this Court; rather, it serves to support what this Court has been doing in
protecting fundamental rights." Id. at 492-93.
276 This writer is generally in accord with the quoted language of Justice Goldberg,
although preferring that "fundamental" be deleted. See Black's cautionary admonition
concerning the misuse of words. Id. at 509-13 & 513 n.5.
277See, e.g., id. at 526 n.21; id. at 500-01 (concurring opinion by Justice Harlan
rejecting "penumbral rights" as a constitutional doctrine).
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Court is therefore able continually" 9 to interpret it judicially so as
to include other rights, e.g., the penumbral aspect, and those who
have obtained judicial recognition for possessing a variety of rights
have included aliens280 and minors."' These latter, of course,
cannot vote, so that by obtaining such rights other than enumerated
ones (whether in the Constitution or the first eight amendments),
they disclose that the ninth amendment's "people" includes others
than the electorate of the Preamble.
The 10th amendment's "powers... reserved... to the people"
stands upon a different historical and conceptual basis than does
the ninth's "rights ... retained by the people." The immediate
language difference is between "powers" and "rights," for "the peo-
ple" are superficially identical. The scheme of government as-
sumed in the Constitution begins with the people in each Colony or
State who are there supposedly all-powerful; they have entered into
compacts amongst themselves and have created State governments,
delegating powers, providing limitations, and so on. Additionally,
these same people later, acting collectively on a national scale, have
created this federal government and have distributed a variety of
powers between it and the existing State governments. They have
taken State powers away and have also created others such as the
power over interstate commerce. All powers however are subject
to certain limitations as evidenced, for example, by the flil faith
and credit and privileges and immunities clauses, and the list of
specific restrictions upon the State and national governments found
in article I, sections 9 and 10. In actuality the people did not si-
multaneously create two separate governments and divide all pow-
ers on a 50-50, 60-40 or other basis, or retain 10 and divide the
remaining 90 as they saw fit. The fact was that originally they
created States,..2 and later took from these existing and continuing
27 8 See M. FoRKoscH, CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW 386-90 (1956).
279 See note 275 supra, on Justice Black's "day-to-day constitutional convention."
280 See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36, 39 (1915). Truax was "a native of
Austria, and an inhabitant of the State of Arizona but not a qualified elector," who had
"been admitted to the United States under the Federal law." (The Court also referred
to earlier [Japanese] cases. Id. at 39-40). The Court upheld his "right to earn a live-
lihood and to continue in employment unmolested by efforts to enforce void enact-
ments . . . " Id. at 38.
281 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (a 15-year-old boy was held to have
been denied several aspects of procedural due process in a (dosed) delinquiency pro-
ceeding).
282 Even this statement requires analysis, for while a Mayflower Compact may have
been a preliminary, disparate, and deliberate such "creation," and a Roger Williams
(as with the Mormons) may have led a band of settlers who later so agreed, most settle-
ments were Topsy-like, i.e., "they jest growed."
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States a variety of powers, and, in the Constitution, gave them to the
national government.2 The 10th amendment reflects these theoreti-
cal concepts and historical facts. It reserves to the States or people
the powers undelegated by the Constitution 8 . and those which are
neither denied to the national government by, for example, section
9 of article I, nor denied to the States, for example by section 10
of article L Put differently, the 10th amendment is declaratory of
what has been given above as the overall conceptual and historical
scheme of government, 285 but it is almost axiomatic at this point
that any such plan could be formulated only by that portion of the
people who could enter into compacts, i.e., the electorate, and other-
wise participate politically, i.e,, "the People" in the Preamble. The
entirety of the people therefore never could be encompassed by the
10th amendment's political motivation and use; "the people" there
are thus a limited and restricted portion of the whole and, if any
identity may be drawn, coextensive with "the People" in the Pream-
ble.286
2 8 3 Pinckney (South Carolina) proposed his own plan to the Convention of 1787
immediately after Randolph had presented Virginia's. I FAILAND RECORDS, supra
note 81, at 16 (Pinckney's is given in 3 id. at 595, 604-09), and it contained, in article
XVIII, a miniature bill of rights. But see id. at 609 n.3; 2 id. at 340-41. In discuss-
ing his proposals Pinckney referred to the fact that "[t]here have been frequent but
unsuccessful attempts by Congress to obtain from the States the grant of additional
powers .... " 3 id. at 122. But see id. at 106 n.1. "The people," therefore, now did
what the States had refused to do. See also quotation from United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), in note 268 supra. Cf. New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 594-95 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
2 84 Although the States are not granted powers in the Constitution, it may be noted
that every one of the seven articles in the Constitution mentions States, and that if the
term were removed from that document it would, as a form of government, collapse.
Throughout, the States are assumed to have certain powers, obligations, and so on, and
the federal government builds upon these. See, e.g., M. FORKoSCH, supra note 278,
§8.
28 5 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324-25 (1816), where
Story's language is most apropos. He concludes that his "deductions do not rest upon
general reasoning, plain and obvious as they seem to be. They have been positively
recognized by" the 10th amendment Id. at 325.
288The same term in other places may likewise partake of this ambivalence, e.g.,
the first amendments "right of the people" to assemble and petition, that in the second
"to keep and bear Arms," and in the fourth "to be secure in their persons ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Camara v. Municipal Court (San Francisco), 387
U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), indicate that in the
fourth amendment area the term encompasses the totality, as does N.A.A.C.P. v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), for the first amendment's rights, although the second
amendment's "people" logically may well be limited. For example, in the first clause
of article IV, section 2, the entitlement of privileges and immunities is to "citizens of
each State," and in the 14th amendment's second sentence of section 1, the reference
is to "citizens of the United States." These are express terms of limitation, e.g., exclud-
ing aliens, but in the first sentence of section 1 of the 14th amendment, "persons" re-
fers to all humans only, whereas in the second sentence "person" includes not only
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19: 644
V. CONCLUSION
The leveling tendencies during the pre-Convention period have
been mentioned,28 ' and while the subsequent adoption of the Con-
stitution may have temporarily been a setback it did not stop, or
even dam, this tide. The immediate request for and passage of a
Bill of Rights, in effect demanded by and promised to the ratifying
conventions, as well as the egalitarianism of the first quarter of the
19th century which culminated in Jacksonian democracy, signified,
to an extent, the arrival of a new and broader base for "We, the
People." The "middling" or middle class people who had influenced
the constitutional language also influenced the Vermont guarantee
of universal suffrage in 179 1;288 and in the next few years most of
the States, original and new, followed suit.28 When politicians
now spoke of "the people," therefore, they no longer appealed to
the selected few of a minority of the population; their constituents
had increased to most, if not all, of those not otherwise disenfran-
chised, e.g., the Negro, so that a somewhat popular sovereignty, if
not an all-inclusive one, was emerging. That the first judiciary was
not uninfluenced by all this is disclosed by flowery and broad lan-
guage in the early reports, for example, that "the mighty hand of
the people" established a Constitution, which therefore "contains
the permanent will of the people . 280 that, according to Mar-
shall,
the instrument was submitted to the people.... The government
proceeds directly from the people .... The government of the
Union, then . . ., is, emphatically and truly, a government of the
people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its
aliens but also corporations. See M. FORKOSCH, supra note 278, § 5 80, 370-75, 386.
For judicial aspects of and holdings concerning the 10th amendment, see THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1035-42 (Small & Jayson, eds. 1964). On
the ninth amendment see id. at 1031.
287 Text accompanying notes 179-84 supra.
288 1 L. HACKEIR, THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION 338 (1947). A
Vermont statute of Oct. 27, 1790 directed that "the first constable in each town shall
warn the inhabitants who by law are entitled to vote for representatives in general as-
sembly, in the same manner as they warn freemen's meetings," to meet and elect dele-
gates to the State ratifying convention. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 371 (1894).
289 1 L. HACKER, supra note 288, at 338. Save for the Southern States which
lagged behind "lilt was not until the fifties that most of them had enfranchised all
their male adult whites."
2 9OVanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (1795). Paterson
and Peters sitting in the United States Circuit Court for the Pennsylvania District, the
charge to the jury being here given, with a foomote disclosing that a writ of error to
the Supreme Court was probably abandoned. Id. at 326 n.3.
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powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on
them, and for their benefit.291
But if Marshall's language here is ambiguous, that is, whom does
the "people" include, 2 years later he sought to clarify it as "the
whole body of the people; not... any subdivision of them."2 9 2 But
by "the whole body" Marshall refers to the collective people - the
total, national electorate - not merely those in one (or more)
State(s); and, as we have seen, even this collectivity is a restricted
and therefore limited one insofar as it authorized and ratified a
Constitution. Thus that a minority. 3 created a document which
was to be exercised (solely) "for their benefit," thereby excluding
all others (i.e., the totality of the people) is manifestly a redactio
ad absardum!
The original term "People" in the Preamble is therefore not, as
popular mythology has dignified it, a broad and inclusive term. It
is limited to a political, not economical or sociological, use, although
it may nevertheless be used separately as an all-inclusive term for
all humans in the country. But it is then further limited in the
Preamble by being restricted to voters, and this second restriction
immediately excludes a host of people, such as minors and aliens. In
this sense, therefore, the original "We, the People" is not to be con-
fused with the people included in a census, or discussed in terms of
the military or economic needs of the nation, and so on. And to
this constitutional restriction there must be added legal and factual
ones, e.g., all those who are eligible to vote do not do so. In effect,
therefore, one should originally speak of "We, the voting People of
the United States," or, if there is desired a different restriction, "We,
the indentured People," although in constitutional history and in-
terpretation only the former is somewhat apropos.
This early constitutional limitation also involves, but is not
limited to, the history of article I, section 9, clause 1, which pre-
vented congressional prohibition of the importation of slaves before
1808. For, as it has been shown, at the time of the Convention not
only slaves but many others, the indentured for example, could not
vote, and other qualifications of many kinds abounded. 9 ' In this
context it is significant that the vast majority of the amendments
291 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,403-05 (1819).
292 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,389 (1821).
2 93 See note 222 supra.
2 94 See generally D. HAWKE, A TRANSACTION OF FREE MEN 231 (1964). After
the Civil War and reconstruction "Americans had decided, for the time being at least,
that the Declaration [of Independence] did not apply to the Negro ...." Id.
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after the original Bill of Rights pertain to the political needs of the
nation, and that of those one finds the 13th, section 2 of the 14th,
15th, 19th, and 24th amendments dealing with the right to vote.
What seems to have occurred, therefore, is that the limited "People"
in the Preamble has generally so remained (politically) limited, but
has nevertheless broadened its coverage within such limitation.
Whether or not this is a correct inference, one conclusion seems to
be that despite this broadened coverage "We, the People" still re-
mains a political term, that no other civil or human rights are en-
compassed by it, and that slogans do not add to it.
This writer does not subscribe to the preceding conclusion.
There is alternative reasoning available which appears to be com-
pelling. Although the Preamble as such is not a source of federal
power"' it may nevertheless be referred to so as "to expound the
nature, and extent, and application of the powers... and not sub-
stantively to create them." '296 For example, Marshall referred to it,
as quoted above, to disclose the base upon which the Constitution
rested,29 although these "People" cannot be extended to any but
those in the United States.298 According to Taney and Warren,
however, the Preamble's term is synonymous with "citizens," and
the former thereupon proceeded to reject one person's claim to privi-
leges, because he was held not to be a citizen,2 99 while the latter's
views were later used to uphold the right of a naturalized citizen to
a renewal of his passport while living in a foreign country, even
though he had voted in an election there."' 0 While Taney and War-
295 See note 9 supra.
296 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 462 (2d ed. 1851).
29 7 See text accompanying note 292 supra.
2 9 8 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453,
464 (1891).
2 99 The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who,
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and who hold
the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They
are what we familiarly call the "sovereign people," and every citizen is one
of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
300 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). Justice Black's majority opinion (5-4)
now "agree[d] with the Chief Justice's dissent in" the earlier case of Perez v. Brown-
eli, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958), in which Justice Douglas also separately had dissented.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion included the following:
This Government was born of its citizens .... I cannot believe that a gov-
ernment conceived in the spirit of ours was established with power to take
from the people their most basic right.
Citizenship is man's basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to
have rights. 356 U.S. at 64.
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ten both agreed that "the People" who created the Federal Govern-
ment were a limited and restricted group of the entirety of the popu-
lation, Warren's shift in language from "citizens" to "the people"
permits one to argue that the two are not necessarily identical, that
is, there may be noncitizens included in "the people" who may have
some "rights," even though citizens have not only these but more,
for example, aliens living here but not yet naturalized citizens."'
Regardless of holdings, the reasoning in both opinions connects the
Preamble's "People" with citizenship, although the 1857 decision's
logical negative was reversed in 1868 by the first sentence of section
1 of the 14th amendment which makes "All persons born or nat-
uralized" here federal citizens. °  While never directly amended,
was not the Preamble indirectly so changed? Is not the earlier in-
terpretation by the Supreme Court now to be altered?.08 These in-
direct judicial amendments to the Constitution, so as to follow the
intent of the people,"°" have precedent and even necessity behind
them, and while it would be temerarious to urge that every amend-
ment to or judicial interpretation of the Constitution automatically
requires wholesale reevaluation, °5 there is no difficulty in reaching
the conclusion here urged.
That conclusion is that "the People" in the Preamble today in-
dudes nor only women, Negroes, servants, and all who come within
amendments such as the 13th, 15th, 19th, and 24th, but also all
who have rights under the due process and equal protection clauses
of the 14th.00 In effect, it may be contended in rebuttal, this per-
801 See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33,39 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
302 See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). There are limitations upon this broad statement, of course.
See generally AL FoRKoScH, supra note 278, § 362.
803 The analogy may be made to a State's highest court's interpretation of a State
constitution or statute, and the changed Supreme Court approach required when and
if the State court's interpretation is altered.
304 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), which in effect created the
12 th amendment. See M. FO RKOsc-, supra note 278, at 83. On indirect judicial
amendments to statutes, see . FoRKoscH, ADmInnSTRATiVE LAw § 302 (1956) (dis-
cussingTexas &Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907)).
805 See, e.g., Commissioner v. James Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964);
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964). The majority
held that the 21st amendment did not repeal article I, section 10's export-import
clause or alter the commerce clause of article I, section 8, clause 3. But see 377 U.S. at
334, 346 (dissents by Justices Black and Goldberg). It has been held that "[a] clas-
sification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by
the Fourteenth." Board of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936).
800 To the extent that much of the Bill of Rights is "incorporated" in the 14th
amendment, the term "people" as so used may or may not be likewise so included in
the Preamble. For example, the first amendment's free speech rights include corpora-
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mits the Preamble to read, "We the total number of People in the
United States, with voting limited to citizens born or naturalized
here and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in Order to form. .. ."
The short answer is that limited partnerships are and have been
common for centuries, that we find nothing strange about a May-
flower Compact covering all the people but entered into by a few
who limit the voting and other rights to themselves, and that even
Magna Carta's limited and restricted parties and scope were, over
the centuries, expanded with the changed times and needs to em-
brace more and more people and rights."0 7 And, further, that in so
concluding, our living Constitution remains alive and responsive to
new generations.
tions. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Corporations are also in-
cluded in the fourth amendment's requirements that an administrative subpoena be not
unreasonably burdensome. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 n.5 (1967); see note
17 supra. Because corporations are certainly not within "the People" mentioned in the
Preamble, a degree of selectivity is here required.
3oT See, e.g., H. CAM, MAGNA CARTA - EVENT OR DOcuMENT? (1965); J.
HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (1965); W. McKECHNI., MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1914).
Throughout the Great Charter the restriction to "free men" which is begun in the first
chapter ("We have also granted to all the free men of our realm .. . all the liberties
written below .... ) is continued, and the famous 29th (39th) opens "No free man
shall be taken ... except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land."
Helen Cam writes that "Coke interpreted Magna Carta lovingly, but inaccurately," and
cites the introduction of Magna Carta into the colonies beginning with 1638, and even-
tually into the Constitution's fifth amendment. H. CAM, supra at 21. She concludes
that "[w] hether all that has been read into the document is historically or legally sound,
is not of the first importance; every historian knows that belief itself is a historical fact,
and that legend and myth cannot be left out of account in tracing the sequence of cause
and effect." Id. at 26.
